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A B ST RACT
This paper focuses on the causes of divorce. Section I develops
a theoretical analysis of marital dissolution incorporating uncertainty
about the outcomes of marital decisions into a framework of utility
maximization and the marriage market. Section II explores the implica-
tions of the theoretical analysis with cross-sectional data,primarily
the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity and the Terman sample. The
relevance of both the theoretical and empirical analyses in explaining




















At the beginning of this century, separation and divorce were
unimportant sources of marital dissolution1 compared to death from
childbirth, contagious diseases, and other causes. Couples marrying
could expect to remain together until death. The substantial decline
in death rates during this century, combined with a steady growth in
separations and divorces that sharply accelerated during the last 15
years, has radically altered these expectations. Today, a typical
couple has only a small probability of being separated by death during
their first 15 years of marriage, but perhaps ten times as high a proba-
bility of being separated by' divorce.2
This dramatic change in the incidence of voluntary dissolutions
has major implications for many kinds of family behavior. Couples are
reluctant to invest in skills or commodities "specific" to their marriage
if they anticipate dissolution. Having children and working exclusively
in the nonmarket sector are two such marriage-related activities that
are discouraged when the probability of divorce is high. Surely the
rise in women's labor force participation rates and the fall in fertility
rates in the past two decades have partly been caused by, as well as
causes of, the rise in marital instability.
Although effects of marital dissolution are discussed, this
paper focuses on the causes of dissolution. Why are divorces more
common among the poor, blacks, geniuses, and the retarded, or among
couples marrying young, or couples in racially or religiously mixed
marriages? Do the causes of cross—sectional differences in divorce also
explain the growth in the divorce rate over time, including its acceleration
during the last 15 years?2
We believe that these causes can be discovered by building on and
extending the analysis of marriage developed by Becker (1974). He assumes
that persons marry when the utility expected from marriage exceeds the utility
expected from remaining single.It is natural to assume further that couples
separate when the utility expected from remaining married falls belci the
utility expected from divorcing and possibly remarrying. One way to reconcile
the relatively high utility expected from marriage at the time of marriage and
the relatively low utility expected at the time of dissolution is to introduce
uncertainty and deviations between expected and realized utilities. That is
to say, persons separating presumably had less favorable outcomes from their
marriage than they expected when marrying.
The first part of this paper develops a theoretical analysis of
marital dissolution that incorporates uncertainty about outcomes of marital
decisions into the framework of utility maximization and the marriage market.
This analysis has implications about the effects of income, age at marriage,
fecundity impairments, number of children, duration of marriage, welfare
payments, and many other variables on the likelihood of marital dissolution.
The analysis is also applicable to other contracts of indefinite duration,
where the parties involved have the option of termination, perhaps with a
penalty. Examples include explicit contracts between business partners and
implicit "contracts" binding together employees and employers, customers and
suppliers, or friends. The relation, for example, of employee turnover to
duration of employment, specific investments, marital status,and other
variables is illuminated by the analysis in this paper.3
The second part of this paper tests these implications with
several bodies of cross—sectional data, primarily the 1967 Survey of
Economic Opportunity and a group of geniuses' that Terman and his
associates have followed for about 50 years. Evidence frommany other
studies and from time series is also discussed. For the mostpart,
the evidence strongly confirms the theoretical predictions.
SECTION I: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
1.1 Basic Framework
Households are assumed to use the nonmarket time and market goods
of their members to produce a set of nonmarketable comodities. Each
person maximizes the utility from the conirnodities that he expects to consume
over his lifetime. With risk—neutrality, this criterion simplifies to the
maximization of expected full wealth --thepresent value of the stream of
commodities consumed. Full wealth does not equalmoney wealth alone, but
also takes account of the productivity of nonmarket time.
Figure 1 illustrates two lifetime streams of commodity income assuming
perfect certainty (i.e., accurate anticipation of the commodity income in
every year). The curve S shows the commodity income stream if the person
never marries: income rises at a decreasing rate until it peaks at a
late age, and then falls until death at t. The curve M shows his or her
income stream from a more complicated set of choices: single until marriage










Although the individual is single until t1 with both streams S and M,
his Income is lower during this interval with M because he is anticipating
and investing for the marriage at t1• His income jumps at marriage and
remains above S while married because of children, the division of labor, and
other gains from marriage (see Becker, 1974).It falls below S after
divorce because S-investments are more oriented to being single than are
M—investments.It again rises above S during the second marriage. The
figure incorporates the finding that marriage apparently lengthens life
expectancy(see Fuchs 1974a).
By assumption, each marital "strategy" produces a known amount of
full wealth, and the opportunity set equals the set of full wealths produced
by all conceivable marital strategies. The individual ranks all strategies
by their full wealth, and chooses the highest.In Figure 1, unless the
discount rate were very high, strategy M would be preferred to strategy 5:
marriage, dissolution, and remarriage would be preferred to remaining
single because of the gains from marriage.If strategy M were preferred to
all other strategies as well, not only marriage but also dissolution and
remarriage would be anticipated because of their benefits. Dissolution would
be a response perhaps to the growing up of children, or to diminishing utility
from living with the same person, and would be a fully anticipated part of
the variation in marital status over the life cycle.
It is commonplace that uncertainty pervades all decisions, and
perhaps nowhere has this been more fully appreciated than in discussions
about marriage.3 Even after prolonged dating, newly married persons face
tremendous uncertainty about their own or their mate's needs, their capacity5
toget along with each other, their fecundity and other aspects of having
and raising children, and so on almost indefinitely. Uncertainty introduces
a whole new dimension into the analysis because dissolution no longer need
be fully anticipated, but can result from unexpected events.
Consider, for example, a person who would receive $1000 of comodity
income in each of two remaining periods if he were single in both, and an
expected income of $1200 in each if he were married in both. Suppose the
marital income is uncertain, however, and the $1200 expected income results
from a 50 percent chance of $800 in each of the two periods and a 50 percent
chance of $1600 in each of the periods. Clearly, his optimal strategy is
to marry in the first period, for his expected full wealth would be lower
with any strategy that had him single in this period. Whether he wants to
remain married in the second period depends on the outcome in the first:
he would remain married if his income were $1600, and would divorce and
become single (thereby receiving say $900 rather than $800 in the second
period) if his income in the first were only $800.
In one sense, the divorce in the second period is anticipated because
the person knows that he will divorce if he receives only $800 in the first
period. However, in a more fundamental sense, the divorce is an unexpected
consequence of an undesirable outcome in the first period, for he would
not marry could he correctly anticipate that he would receive $800. He
could do better by remaining single in both periods.
The analysis can be readily generalized to include many periods,
continuous variation in outcomes, and choice among many potential marriage
mates. The optimal marital decision at any moment would be the one that
maximized the expected value of remaining full wealth, given the realizations6
prior to that moment. The optimal strategy would be the set of all these
optimal decisions. The optimal strategy would in general include divorce at
different stages in the life cycle, sometimes contingent on the real izat ion
of unfavorable outcomes, and sometimes consistent with the realization of
expected outcomes.
With divorce viewed in a stochastic framework, it is natural to
consider the probability of divorce as a function of two parameters: gain
from marriage and the distribution of a variable describing unexpected outcomes.
Suppose the individual anticipates at the time of marriage that the net gain
from remaining married beyond time t is >0),whereas the gain evaluated
at time t is Gt = + where e is a stochastic term with the density
function F(e), mean and variance cx. A positivee reflects an initially
unanticipated positive gain from the marriage, while a negativee reflects
an initially unanticipated loss. The probability that the individual will
wish to djvorce at time t is equal to the probability that G +e
<0,which
-G t
equals f tF(e )de .Therefore,the probability of divorce is greater the
smaller ,thelower 'andthe larger a. That is, the probability of
divorce is greater the smaller the average unanticipated gain from the
marriage (or the larger the average unanticipated loss), and the greater the
variation in the unanticipated outcome.
We suggest that the clear majority of divorces result from uncertainty
and unfavorable outcomes, and, therefore, would not occur in a world where
outcomes could be anticipated. Indirect evidence supporting this view is
that most dissolutions occur early in marriage, not after many years when
children have grown or couples have tired of each other.In fact, the
median duration to divorce has been about seven years, and three-quarters7
of all divorces take place before the fifteenth anniversary of marriage.5
Since there are sizable emotional and financial costs of divorcing, people
would presumably prefer to remain single rather than enter a marriage that
is expected to dissolve within a few years.
Up to this point we have discussed one spouse's decision about
divorce as if the other spouse didn't have any say in the matter.If the
two spouses concur in judging their own expected full wealth to be greater
either by remaining married or by divorcing, there would be no disagreement
about whether or not to divorce. But what if these judgements differ? If
all compensations between spouses were feasible and costless, a couple would
separate if, and only if, their combined wealth from remaining married were
expected to be less than their combined wealth when separated. For if their
expected married-wealth were greater than their combined expected separated
wealth while one spouse expected greater separated-wealth, the other spouse
would be able to bribe the first to remain marriedLikewise, if their combined
separated-wealth were greater than their married wealth while one spouse expected
less separated—wealth, he or she could be bribed to separate (if consent were
required) because the one spouse's gain would exceed the other's loss.Indeed,
compensation of a spouse to induce acquiescence is an excellent illustration
of the "Coase Theorem" that the allocation of property rights or legal liability
does not influence resource allocation when the parties involved can bargain
with each other at little cost.
The conclusion that a couple dissolves their marriage if, and only if,
their combined wealth when dissolved exceeds their combined married-wealth
is a direct extension of the conclusion (see Becker, l97L) that single persons
marry if, and only if, their combined married-wealth exceeds their combined8
single-wealth.Both assume that the division of wealth between mates is
flexible, which contrasts sharply with the assumption implicit in many dis-
cussions; namely, that the division of married wealth is rigidly determined
by custom, "family" goods, and the like.
If the division were not flexible, dissolution could be opposed by
one mate if his separated—wealth were less than his married-wealth, even
though their combined separated-wealth would exceed their married wealth.
Although contested divorces are well publicized, the fact is that over 85
percent of divorces granted since the l880's have not been contested.6 The
low incidence of contested divorces provides some evidence that the division
between mates is not so rigid. Asset transfers and alimony payments after
dissolution introduce more flexibility into the division than may appear
from the importance of "family" goods, in the same way that asset transfers
prior to marriage -—suchas dowries and bride prices -—introducemore
flexibility into marital divisions.
Although marital separations are easily obtained in practically all
countries, some forbid divorce, others require mutual consent, and still
others require extenuating circumstances --adultery,impotence, insanity,
desertion, etc. When mutual consent is required, not only must the combined
wealth of divorcing couples exceed their combined marital wealth, but the
wealth of each must also be raised by divorce. Therefore, the requirement
of mutual consent insures that the benefits are shared; one mate could not
gain from a divorce largely at the expense of the other.
If the division of wealth between spouses is sufficiently flexible, it
is not meaningful to say that one mate "walked out" on or was "abandoned" by
the other. This is obviously not a useful distinction when each gains from9
divorce,but it is also true, if less obviously, when divorce is available at
the option of either mate. Suppose that one mate gained 100 units and his
spouse lost 60 units of real income from a divorce, relative to their
divorce division of outputs. Relative to that division, when divorce occurs
one might say she was "abandoned" and he "walked out." He would be willing
to stay, however, if the division within marriage were changed in his favor
by at least 100 units, but with that division she would 'wa1k out" and he
would be "abandoned" because sh would gain more than kO units from a divorce,
and he would lose. Whether one mate "walks out" or is "abandoned" is ambiguous,
therefore; it depends critically on the marital division that is used as a
yardstick.
The same argument applies to the distinction between "quits" and
"layoffs" in discussions of the turnover of employees.If the combined wealth
of a firm and employee were decreased by a separation, there would exist a
transfer (i.e., a wage payment) from the firm to the employee (or vice-versa)
that would induce them to stay together. Of course, even if their combined
wealth were increased by separation, the firm would want to keep him and he
would want to leave at some wage. However, at a sufficiently higher wage,
the firm would want him to leave and he would want to stay. Although wage
"rigidity" may prevent fluid divisions between firms and employees, the
rigidity in labor (as well as marriage markets) has been greatly exaggerated,
and combined maximization is probably also the appropriate model in labor
markets.
Instead of basing the distinction between quits and layoffs on rigidity
in the wage or marital division, a more promising approach relies on the cause
of a job or marital separation. A quit could be said to result from an improve-10
ment in opportunities elsewhere, and a layoff from a (usually unexpected)
worsening in opportunities in this job or marriage. This way of distinguishing
quits from layoffs has many implications, among them that persons quitting have
shorter spells of unemployment (or duration of time to remarriage) than persons
laid off, and improve their circumstances more in their new jobs (or marriages).7
1.2 Dissolution_and Expected Gains from Marriage
We indicated above that the probability of divorce is, greater the smaller
the expected gain from marriage,, provided unexpected gains are not strongly
negatively correlated with the expected gain. Becker (19714) provides an exten-
sive analysis of optimal marital sorting that explains the predominance of
positive assortative mating with respect to personal characteristics such as
education, height, intelligence, age, property income, physical attractiveness,
etc. The explanation applies to all traits which are not good substitutes
in the production of commodity income, while negative assortative mating would
beoptimal for substitutes such as wage-earning power. Becker further shows
that where positive assortative mating is optimal, persons with higher-valued
characteristics gain more from marriage (compared to being single). So couples
with, say, more property income or education would be expected to have greater
gains from marriage and consequently a lower probability of divorce.
Becker's analysis of optimal sorting assumes that the traits and
productive capacities of persons are fixed. However, they are affected by
the marital sorting itself. For example, a person will tend to specialize in
acquiring skills that raise his market productivity compared to his nonmarket
productivity if he spends more of his time in the market sector after he is
married as a result of substitution of his spouse's time for his in the nonmarket
sector. Conversely, he will specialize more in acquiring nonmarket skills if
he spends more of his time in the nonmarket sector after marriage.11
Therefore, the gain from marriage compared to being single also depends
on the extent to which investments in skills are oriented to the division of
labor within marriage. The effect of specialized investments on the incentive
to become and stay married can explain, among other things, why women have
traditionally married earlier: their investments have been more closely geared
to child—rearing, household management, and other domestic activities that
are much less useful to single persons.8
As another example, consider men with relatively9 high earnings potential.
In the optimal sorting, they marry women with relatively low earnings potential,
greater physical attractiveness, and superior other nonmarket characteristics.
Therefore, men with relatively high earnings potential gain more from marriage
than men with relatively low earnings potential not only because of the higher
level of their income but also because of greater gains from specialization
within marriage, since their mates have a comparative advantage in specializing
in nonmarket investments.
The effect of specialized investments on the gain from marriage does not
reinforce the effect of optimal sorting, however, for persons with relatively
high levels of education. On the one hand, marriages between highly educated
individuals have greater gains because of the spouses' high levels of education
and other market and nonmarket characteristics. On the other hand, they may
have lower gains because they typically involve less specialization between
spouses, since more educated women participate more in the labor force.
Consequently, there is no clear theoretical prediction about the net effect
of education on the gain from marriage.12
1.3 Dissolution and Search
In this section we discuss the sorting of persons and the stability
of marriages when there is limited information about the traits of potential
mates, and when remarriage is not possible.It is often difficult ——thatis,
expensive --inactual marriage markets to find a satisfactory mate. For
example, persons with rare traits, such as an IQ over 150, a million dollars,
a height in excess of 66", or being a Moslem in South Dakota, usually have
to spend considerable resources "searching" for mates with similar traits
because most persons encountered have more typical traits. Anticipating
these difficulties, persons with rare traits may compromise and settle for
mates with less similar traits; that is, they may give up the gains from a
more "optimal1' mate in order to reduce their expenditures of time and money
on search. The costs of finding a satisfactory mate are important in under-
standing marital dissolutions because they change the expected gain from marriage,
special1y for persons with certain characteristics.
Imperfect information that results from the cost of finding a mate cannot
increase the gain from marriage above the "optimal" (i.e., the gain with perfect
information) for any couple, and will reduce the gain for most couples. Since the
total gain from marriage over all marriages is maximized in the "optimal" sorting,
persons not matched in this sorting could not increase their gain by marrying each
other. Consequently, most couples will gain less in all other sortings, and some
couples may gain the same amount. The actual and "optimal" sortings differ be-
cause the cost of finding a mate induces at least some couples to accept a lower
gain from marriage than they would receive in the "optimal" sorting. The larger
the marital search costs, the smaller the acceptable gain, and the larger the
deviations from the "optimal"sorting. Although all couples gain less (or at
least do not gain more) than in the Uoptimal$I sorting, some persons withrelatively low search costs may gain more because they can capitalize on
the greater search costs of others to make advantageous marriages.
The process of searching for a mate can be formalized along the
lines developed in the extensive recent literature on search.1° Each
person spends resources selecting a drawing from a frequency distribution
of potential mates; each drawing gives the wealth that can be expected from
that match. This frequency distribution is determined by the search costs of
all persons in the marriage market.If search costs were zero for everyone,
this distribution would reduce to a single point —-theperson's wealth in the
optimal sorting.
After each drawing the individual must decide whether to accept that
match or to continue searching for a better one. The cost of continuing to
search for a better match is the sum of search costs and any income foregone
by remaining single rather than marrying an available match. That is, the
cost of searching one more period is+(1a
-I),wherec is the direct
mf mo
search cost, Iis the expected income from remaining single for the period,
and I is the expected income during that period from marrying the best
available potential spouse. The term in parentheses is included in the cost
only if it is positive.If it were negative, the expected opportunity cost
of remaining single is zero. The expected benefit from continuing to search
equals the product of the probability of finding a preferable mate, c, times
the expected increase in wealth from finding a preferable mate, Ga =(W
-w)
where Wf is the expected wealth from a better match and is the expected
wealth in the best available marital status (i.e., single or married to the
best available potential spouse). The individual is indifferent to accepting
the available offer when the cost and expected benefit from additional search
are equal114
= c( -Wa)= +(]a-
), (1) mf m mf mo
or when
1a - (2) mf mo mf
where V is the value of additional search. mf
The discussion is illustrated in Figure2, where gg is the frequency
distribution of expected wealth offers from differentmatches,. and W is his mo
expected wealth from remaining single.If the cost of search equalled c° and
the minimum acceptable wealth offerwas W, the resulting average wealth
from all acceptable offers would beWf and the expected gain from an acceptable
match would be G°. An increase in searchcosts to c1 , everyone else's costs
remaining the same, would lower the minimum acceptable offerto, say Wmf•
Consequently, the average acceptable wealth would be loweredto and the
expected gain from an acceptable match would be lowered to G'.Since we have
shown that marital dissolutions aremore frequent when the expected gain is
smaller, dissolutions would increase when searchcosts increase.
Actual marital offers differ evenamong persons with the same search
costs and the same frequency distribution of offers.Some will be "lucky',
receiving better offers than Wf in Figure 2, andsome will be "unlucky".
The latter will have, after the marital searchprocess ends, lower expected
gains from marriage, and thus higher probabilities ofdivorce.
The search process can also be usefully describedin terms of the
set of acceptable traits.If search costs, wealth, and number ofpersons
varied continuously as a function oftraits, the acceptable traits would form
a closed continuous set around the optimal trait (i.e.,the trait of one's
mate in a world with perfect information). Theupper and lower bounds of
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(optimal A' A A A match)match with either trait A or traitAU must equal the value of additional
search when these matches are available. That is, these matches mustboth
satisfy equation (1) and must both provide the same wealth, Waf.The offers
available from matches to persons with traits anywhere to theleft of A or
to the right of AU must be less than the value ofadditional search when
faced with these matches (otherwise these traits would be in the acceptable
set), so continuity implies equality between the offers and thevalue of
search at the boundaries of the acceptable set. These boundaries are
determined not only by one's own search costs, but also by the costsof
everyone else in the marriage market, thedistribution of traits in this
market, and household production functions.
Since one's offers must exceed the value of search in the Interiorof
the acceptable set, these offers would exceed the offer at theboundaries.12
In Figure 3 we assume the wealth offers rise continuously withA from the
lower boundary to a peak somewhere near the "optimal" match,andthen fall
continuously to the upper boundary. The distribution ofoffers need not be
symmetrical around the peak offer, so that the lower and upperboundaries
will not in general be equally far from the peak.
The relationship between Figures 2 and 3 is such that a movement tothe
left along the distribution of wealth offers in Figure 2 corresponds,although
not perfectly, to a movement in either direction awayfrom the "optimal"
matching trait in Figure 3. Therefore, when one accepts anoffer closer to
the minimum acceptable offer, he generally accepts a greater"mismatch", a
greater deviation between his actual and his "optimal"matching trait. An
increase in search costs alone lowers one's minimum acceptableoffer, and widens
the boundaries of his acceptable set of traits in Figure 3.Greater mismatches16
become acceptable because the value of additional search is reduced by the
increase in search costs. Consequently, an increase in search costs can be
said to increase the frequency of dissolutions because it increases the
incidence of "mismatches"; hence, dissolutions and "mismatches" should be
positively related empirically.
The equilibrium acceptable sets of men and women in the marriage
market are interrelated in a very simple way.If A is the lower bound
of males with the trait Amthen Am is the upper bound for females with
A;13 similarly, Am. is the lower bound for females with Ai. Therefore,
if all the male boundaries were known, all the female boundaries wouldalso
be known, and vice-versa. Moreover, if all male boundaries increased as
their trait increased, then all female boundaries would also increase as
their own trait increased.In addition, an expansion or contraction of
all (or just some) male boundaries due to an increase or decrease in their
search costs would mean that all (or just some) female boundaries are
induced to expand or contract.
Note that although the expected duration of a narriaaewould be shorter
when the "mismatch" was greater, this does not per se reduce the incentive to
accept a "mismatch." On the contrary, the freedom to dissolve a marriage
in response to unfavorable events or information about the marriage (or
favorable events or information about being divorced) reduces the effect of
this information on expected wealth, and thereby increases the incentive to
accept a "mismatch". This conclusion is relevant in evaluating the belief
that dissolutions are evidence of marital failure that should be avoided if
at all possible. Dissolution is a response to unfavorable information, and
favorable information is obviously preferable, but the freedom to dissolve17
reduces the impact of unfavorable information, and thereby reduces the incentive
to delay marriage or otherwise search more in order to avoid a "mismatch."
The incentive to invest in marital specific capital would however, be smaller
the greater the mismatch (see section 1.5).
In addition to the "extensive" search, there is "intensive" search to
improve the accuracy and reliability of expectations about a particular
match. An individual spends time and other resources learning more about
a potential spouse through dating and other contacts because his expectations
are partly determined by information he has about himself and the potential
mate.In a simple model of this search process, evidence on the match accrues
at a constant rate during the match. Clearly, the probability of dissolution
would be smaller the smaller the variance in the distribution of realized
wealth; it would also be smaller the longer the duration of a match because
only matches with favorable realizations survive longdurations.14
The simple model can be generalized to permit the flow of evidence to
depend on direct search outlays, and on whether the search was prior or
subsequent to marriage. Using the arguments developed for extensive search,
we can show that an increase in intensive search costs reduces the optimal
accumulation of information prior to marriage. As a result, the probability
of dissolution would be greater when intensive search costs were greater
because the probability of entering into a "mismatch" --amatch involving
a greater variance in outcomes and possibly a lower mean outcome --wouldbe
greater. Therefore, an increase in either the cost of intensive or extensive
search would increase the probability of dissolution.
Moreover, the optimal amounts of intensive and extensive search are
not independent. Presumably, a person skilled at one kind of searching
also tends to be skilled at the other; also, an increase in the value of18
one's time increases the cost of both kinds of search. Since extensive and
intensive search are positively related, smaller expected gains from marriage
(due to less extensive search) and less reliable expectations (due to less
intensive search) tend to go together. Consequently, the expected gain and
the variance in realizations are probably negatively related, not independent
as we have been assuming.
Several determinants of the cost of search are now considered.If a
matching trait is rare --suchas very high or very low intelligence, an
uncommon race or religion, blindness or deafness --extensivesearch costs
could be greater because persons with average traits are more readily
encountered in the marriage market.'5 That is, the frequency distribution
of offers to persons looking for rare traits is less dense in the region
of acceptable offers.16 Consequently, the probability of "mismatches," and
thus of marital dissolutions, would be greater with rare traits.
Women who become pregnant accidentally while searching for a mate have
an incentive to marry quickly, even f they have not completed their search,
because of their desire to "legitimate" their children. Put differently,
they are more likely to accept a "mismatch" because the cost to them of
additional intensive and extensive search has increased. Therefore, accidental
premarital conceptions should increase the probability of marital dissolution.
An important finding in practically every study of marital dissolution
is that persons marrying much younger than average have significantly higher
probabilities of dissolution.If the cost of search differed primarily
because of differences in, say, the cost of time or even the incidence ofpre-
marital conceptions, persons with higher costs would marry relativelyyoung,
and would be relatively more likely to dissolve their marriage.1719
Age at marriage also depends on the degree of bias in expectations.
Persons who are excessively pessimistic about their distribution of potential
offers relative to the offers sampled (or excessively optimistic about the
sampled offers relative to the distribution) tend to marry earlier because the
sampled offers appear to be attractive compared to the value of additional
search. Similarly, optimists about the distribution of offers (or pessimists
about the sampled offers) tend to marry later because additional search appears
attractive.
The additional evidence accruing after marriage would induce persons who
were excessively optimistic about their mates to revise downward their expec-
tations, and would thereby increase the probability of dissolution. Since
persons marrying at young ages are on average more optimistic, they would be
more likely to dissolve their marriages. The probability of dissolution may
not continue to decline with age at marriage, however. As persons continue
to be unmarried, their expectations probably become more realistic, and they
reduce their minimum acceptable income offers; they would also reduce their
acceptable offers because the number of years they could remain married would
be declining. This is especially relevant for women, since after age 40 they
have a significantly limited capacity to bear children. A reduction of the
acceptable offers, however, raises the probability of dissolution because it
reduces their gain from marriage. Theefore, the probability of dissolution
could begin to rise for persons marrying at relatively older ages.
We have said little about the opportunity cost of search, i.e., the income
foregone by remaining single and continuing to search intensively and extensively
instead of accepting the best available offer. An increase in opportunity costs,
say due to a decline in a person's single income, reduces the amount of search.
The probability of dissolution is increased by the reduction in search20
because less accurate information would be acquired about any match, but the
reduction in single income raises the expected gain fromany given match, which
In turn lowers the probability of dissolution.18 The net effect would bean
increase in the probability of dissolution only if the reduction in information
dominated the increase in expected gains.
1.1+ Dissolution and Investment in Marital—Specific Capital
Married persons invest in many assets, including houses, children,
market and nonmarket skills and information. Some of these investments, such
as in household appliances, automobiles, or knowledge of consumer prices,
would be almost as valuable to them if their marriage dissolved. Others,
however, would be much less valuable to them if their marriage dissolved.
Children are an Important example of the latter type, since one parent usually
has much less contact with their children after dissolution. Other examples
include information acquired about one's spouse, sexual adjustment with one's
spouse, and specialized market end nonmarket skills used relatively more while
married, because single persons engage In less extensive division of labor
between the market and nonmarket sectors. The investments that are significantly
less valuable when single can be called "marital-specific" (see Becker, 1974,
p. 338).
The accumulation of "general" capital does not affect the expected
gain from remaining married compared to dissolution, whereas the accumulation
of marital—specific capital raises the expected gain because, by definition,
this capital is not asvaluable when single. Therefore, the accumulation of
specific capital discourages dissolution.
Of course, the causation runs in both directions: the possibility of
dissolution also discourages the accumulation of specific capital because
such capital is less valuable after dissolution. For example,persons with21
high search costs, such as those with rare traits, or persons unlucky in
their search, would tend to invest 1ess in children-and specific skills
because their marriages have a higher probability of dissolution. They may
be especially cautious in the first few years of marriage when the probability
of dissolution is usually higher.Indeed, a major reason why couples search
intensively during the first few years after marriage is to improve their
information before they invest substantially in specific capital.
Since an autonomous increase in the probability of dissolution dis-
courages investment in specific capital, which further increases the probability
of dissolution, an increase in, say, search costs would increase this probability
partly because it induces a decline in specific-capitalinvestment)9 Moreover,
expectations become self—fulfilling in the sense that a rise in the anticipated
probability of dissolution may be partly realized only because the induced
decline in specific capital Increases the actual probability of dissolution.
Perhaps after an initial period of caution due to uncertainty about dis-
solution, marital-specific capital would growwith duration, at first rapidly,
then more slowly, including a possible decline at long durations. Since
specific capital reduces dissolutions, the probability of dissolution would
tend to decline at a decreasing rate with dissolution; as the stock of specific
capital eventually declined --perhapsbecause children grew up --dissolutions
might eventually even begin to increase.
1.5 Dissolution and Remarriage
Although we have assumed that persons dissolving their marriages must
remain single, the great majority in the United States eventually remarry:
80 percent of divorced males and 75percentof divorced females eventually
remarry.2° Even countries that forbid divorce and legal remarriage cannot prevent22
common law or "consensual" remarriage.21 When remarriage is possible, the
wealth expected from remaining married would be compared not only to the
wealth from becoming divorced, but also to that from remarrying. Dissolution
would be warranted when the wealth from remaining married was less than the
best alternative, including remarriage by one or both mates.
The possibility of remarriage could greatly increase the probability
of dissolution since the -realized wealth from a marriage could remain above
single wealth, but could be below a much higher expected wealth from remarriage.
Moreover, a decrease in the expected gain from marriage compared to being single
might actually reduce the probability of dissolution because the expected gain
compared to remarriage could increase. For example, a reduction in the minimum
acceptable marriage offer in Figure 2 reduces the gain compared to being single,
but could increase the gain compared to remarriage if the distribution of offers
and the minimum acceptable offer were the same in both the remarriage and the
first-marriage markets.
Nevertheless, specific capital, search costs, and variables that affect
the gain from marriage under certainty tend to have the same qualitative effects
on the probability of dissolution when remarriage is possible as we have shown
them to have when remarriage is excluded. This is obvious for the capital
specific to a particular marriage -—suchas children --orfor variables like
expected income and beauty that affect the gain from marriage.22It is less
obvious for search costs because an increase in the cost reduces the value of
search in the remarriage market along with the minimum acceptable offer for
a first marriage.
Yet an increase in the cost of search would tend to increase the
probability of dissolution even when the distribution of offers and the23
minimum acceptable offer were the same in both the remarriage and first-
marriage markets. For one thing, if an increase in the cost of search
increased the cost of intensive search (and hence the variance of outcomes
from a given match) along with the cost of extensive search, the probability
of dissolution would increase because a larger fraction of outcomes from a
first marriage would be less than the minimum acceptable offer, which equals
the value of searching for a new mate.
Remarriage has significant effects on the timing and incidence of
dissolutions. An unexpected increase in wealth -—perhapsbecause one
mate's earnings or the other's nonmarket productivity was greater than
anticipated --wouldincrease the gain from continuing the marriage compared
to becoming divorced because married wealth typically would be increased by
more than single wealth. The probability of dissolution would be reduced,
therefore, if being divorced were the only alternative to remaining married.
If remarriage were possible, however, the probability of dissolution might
well be increased because the gain from marrying someone else could increase
by more than the gain from remaining married to the current mate. For example,
a more educated, beautiful, competent, or healthy mate would have been
selected if a person anticipated that his earnings, personality, or health
would turn out as well as it did. His actual mate would try to maintain
their marriage by giving him a larger share of their full wealth. But beyond
some point, their combined wealth from dissolution would exceed their wealth
from staying together.
This positive relation between unexpected favorable outcomes and the
incentive to dissolve marriage can be used to reconcile the actual evidence
on dissolutions with some popular beliefs. For example, it is almost univer-
sally believed that higher income persons separate and divorce more frequently2L4
thanothers, yet statistical studies invariably show the opposite. Since
an unusually large fraction of persons who were favorably surprised have
high incomes --suchas persons who married as undergraduates and became
successful lawyers, physicians or executives --popularbeliefs can be
dominated by the positive effect of favorable surprises on dissolutions,
whereas the statistical evidence is dominated by the negative effect of
high anticipated ("permanent") incomes.23
In addition, an increase in the cost of search increases the
probability that search after marriage would reveal a preferable match.
When remarriage is possible, continued marital search may be quite rational,
and the frequency of extramarital relations is some evidence on the importance
24 of such search. Since an increased cost of search lowers the expected
value of the offer accepted in the first marriage, it raises the probability
that a random drawing from the remarriage market will produce a better match.
To be sure, the offers after marriage may not be randomly chosen, andmay
depend on the effort devoted to finding them. Since an increase in the cost
of search raises the cost of this effort as well, an increase in the cost
need not be positively related to the number of attractive offers. Presumably,
however, the "spontaneous" or "random" search that does raise the number of
preferable offers for persons with high search costs is an important part of
the total search of married persons since their marital status often severely
limits the effort they can devote to search.
We conclude that even when the distribution of offers and hence the
minimum acceptable offers are the same in both the remarriage and the first-
marriage markets, couples with less marital-specific capital, higher search
costs, and otherwise lower expected gains from marriage and larger variances
in outcomes dissolve their first marriages more readily. This conclusion25
is reinforced by several arguments suggesting that opportunities in the
remarriage market are less favorable than opportunities available before
they married.(1) Until recently the remarriage market has been ''thin"
because only a small fraction of couples divorced.25 (2) Divorced women's
participation in this market has been handicapped by custody of children
from first marriages: children raise the cost of searching for another mate,
and discourage many potential mates.26 (3) Divorced persons are also older
than those entering the first marriage market, and older persons tend to
gain less from marriage, especially if they do not want or are unable to have
additional children.
By suggesting that opportunities in the remarriage market are less
favorable than those in the first-marriage market we mean, formaily, that
the difference between the mean of the distribution of offers in the remarriage
market and non-married wealth is smaller than the difference between the mean
of the distribution of offers in the first-marriage market and single-wealth.
So the minimum acceptable offer of each person would be closer to nonmarried
wealth in the remarriage market than in the first-marriage market. Indeed,
the minimum acceptable offers of some persons, especially persons with
smaller acceptable offers in the first-marriage market, would be reduced to
the level of non-married-wealth, and these persons would not want to remarry.27
The earlier analysis that ruled out remarriage would be directly applicable
28
to these persons,and they would not search for another mate.
Since divorced persons tend to have lower expected gains and higher
variances in outcome from marriage than persons remaining married, the
average person marrying a second time would tend to have a lower expected
gain and higher variance than the average person marrying a first time.2926
Therefore, the dissolution rate on second marriages of persons divorced the
first time3° should tend to exceed the rate on first marriages. More generally,
the dissolution rate and the order of a marriage should be positively related.
Specific capital can also explain why second or later marriages are more
likely to dissolve than first marriages, even when duration of current marriage,
age at current marriage, and other characteristics are held constant. Children
(and perhaps other specific capital) from previous marriages could reduce the
stability of the current marriage because they are a source of friction; that
is, positive specific capital in one marriage could be "negative' specific
capital in a subsequent marriage.31 Moreover, persons who dissolved their
first marriage may have anticipated dissolution, and invested more in general
ways that would be useful when divorced or in other marriages. These invest-
ments in turn reduce the stability of subsequent marriages by increasing the
attractiveness of divorcing again. One implication, therefore, is that termina-
tion of a first marriage per se increases the probability of dissolving future
marriages because of the destabilizing effects of specific capital from the
first marriage.32
1.6 Summary
A list of the major implications derived from the theoretical analysis
provides a useful summary for the empirical analysis in Section II.
(1) An increase in the expected value of variables positively sorted
in the optimal sorting of mates, such as the earnings of men and the beauty
of women, lowers the probability of dissolution and raises the probability
of remarriage if dissolved. The reason is that the expected gain from marriage
will increase. On the other hand, an increase in the expected value of
variables negatively sorted in the optimal sorting of mates, such as27
the earnings of women relative to those of men, raises the probability of
dissolution and lowers the probability of remarriage given dissolution..
(2) A larger deviation between actual and expected values, such as
actual and expected earnings or fecundity, raises the probability of dissolu-
tion. The reason is that the gain from becoming divorced or from marrying
someone else increases by more than the gain from remaining married to the
same spouse.
(3) An increase in education has an ambiguous effect on the proba-
bilities of dissolution and remarriage. The reason is that education reduces
the division of labor between mates (thus lowering the gain from marriage)
while increasing the gain from any given division of labor.
(1+)An increase in age at marriage tends to reduce the probability
of dissolution, especially at relatively young ages. The reason is that
persons marrying relatively young are less informed about themselves, their
mates, and the marriage market. The probability of dissolution may begin
to rise with age at marriage at relatively older ages, however, as the marriage
market becomes "thin' and the gains from marriage begin to decline.
(5) An increase in marital-specific capital ,exemplifiedby young
children, reduces the probability of dissolution. The reason is that such
capital would be worth less in any other marriage or when divorced. Con-
versely, an increase in the probability of dissolution reduces the demand
for marital specific capital. Children and perhaps other specific capital
may also lower the probability of remarriage and raise the dissolution
rate on remarriages because they hinder the search for another mate and
reduce the gain from remarriage.
(6) A larger discrepancy between the traits of mates and what they
would be in the optimal sorting --e.g.,discrepancies between intelligence,28
social background, religion or race --raisesthe probability of dissolution
and towers the probability of remarriage if divorced. The reason is that the
gain from marriage is reduced. More generally, an increase in the cost of
finding a suitable mate increases the probability of dissolution.
(7) The probability of dissolution tends to decline as the duration
of a marriage increases. The reason is that marital—specific capital such
as children, sexual compatibility and knowledgeof one's mate, increases
with duration. (The observed probability of dissolution would decline with
duration in a given cohort of marriages also because couples with higher
probabilities of dissolution dissolve their marriages relatively early, so
the average probability of those remaining married would decline even if each
couple's probability were invariant with duration.)
(8) The speed and probability of remarriage depend directly on the
expected gain from remarriage; therefore, they depend directly on male earnings
and Inversely on female earnings and the stock of capital specific to prior
marriages (such as children from those marriages). They also depend directly
on the duration of prior marriages because marriages tend to last longer when
the expected gain is greater.
(9) The probability of dissolution is higher on second than on first
marriages, is still higher on third marriages, and so forth. The reason is
that persons dissolving their marriages are not selected at random, but are
selected by characteristics that lower the gain from remaining married. More-
over, even if dissolutions of first marriages were selected at random, the
dissolution rate on subsequent marriages would be greater. The reason is that
children and perhaps other specific capital from the first marriage would
lower the gain from subsequent marriages.29
SECTION II: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Fortunately, many of the theoretical impflcations listed above can
be explored in detail empirically using several bodies of data which give
the incidence of divorce and remarriage by duration of marriage, number
of children, education, earnings, age at marriage, number of marriages, and
other variables. Indeed, since data on the stability of marriages are more
extensive than are data on job or residential stability, marital behavior
offers a relatively fertile area for testing a theory about the stability of
contractual relations.
We have analyzed in detail two data sets: primarily, a nationwide
survey of approximately 30,000 households conducted by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census in 1967 (the Survey of Economic Opportunity [SEO] data), and also
a survey of approximately 1500 persons with IQ's over 135 who were first
surveyed in 1921 by psychologist Lewis Terman, and who were resurveyed
periodically over the subsequent fifty years (the Terman Survey). These two
data sets, as well as the findings from many studies that use other data,
enable us to investigate many of the implications about marital behavior
derived from the theory in Section II.
The outline of Section II is as follows. We first present findings on
first-marriage divorce rates for men and women separately, and then present
some evidence on the relationship between search costs, marital-specific
capital, and the probability of divorce. Next we consider the likelihood
of remarriage and second-marriage divorce. We conclude with a brief dis-
cussion of secular changes in the divorce rates.30
11.1 Stability of First Marriage
Men. The SEO survey contains information on the number of times
married, the dates of first and current marriages, and the date andtype
of termination of each marriage.33 From this informationwe constructed
separate data files for men and women containing information on the
stability of each person's first marriage in five—year intervals beginning
with the date of marriage, and running through the 25thanniversary of the
marriage. There are, for example, 4413 white men aged 35-55 in 1967 for
whom we know whether their first marriage was still intactat the time of
the fifth anniversary of their marriage. Of thatgroup, 3.51 percent had
divorced by the fifth anniversary and the remainderwere still married.4
Likewise, there are some 4045 men whose first marriage was still intactat
the fifth anniversary of the marriage and whose tenthwedding anniversary
had occurred prior to the time of the SEC interview;2.27 had divorced
prior to the tenth anniversary. The SECsurvey also contains information
on the income and education in 1967 of each person sampled, and the birth-
dates of four children (the first two and the last two) bornto each woman.35
The following OLS regession6 was estimated for malesaged 3555 for










D = 1if the first marriage dissolved in that marriage—duration
interval and 0 if the first marriage was still intact at the
end of that interval
AM =ageat first marriage
AM2 =squareof AM
S =yearsof schooling completed by 196731
A =agein 1967
E =annualearnings in 1966
E2 =squareof E.
Table 1, columns 1-5 gives the implied partial effects of the four
explanatory variables on the probability of divorce within each five-year
interval.37 The bottom panel gives the means and standard deviations of
the variables in each of the five subsamples. Since men were included in
the subsample only if their first marriage was intact at the beginning of
the interval and the full five years had elapsed before the survey date in
1967, the mean age of the subsample tended to be older and the mean age at
marriage younger at later durations (e.g., in the first five-year interval,
the mean age was 14147 and the mean age at marriage was 23.9, whereas by the
fifth interval they were 50.9 and 22.0 respectively).8
An increase in age at marriage has a strong negative effect on the
probability of divorce at relatively early ages at marriage, but the effect
gets smaller at later ages and consistently turns positive at agesof marriage
above 3Q•39 The strong negative effect of age at marriage on divorce rates
is one of the most widely observed correlates in the divorceliterature;1
an upturn beyond age 30 is also evidenced in Census data but is not SO
frequently recognized in the demographiciiterature.41 The initial strong
negative effect and the eventual positive effect of age at marriage on
divorce are both quite consistent with our theory (see implication (1+) in
Section 1.6).
The effect of education on divorce is generally not statistically
significant and not even stable in sign. Although the simple correlations



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and other data, the results in Table i142 suggest that the effect of age at
marriage and earnings explains the negative simple correlation between men's
education and men's divorce rates since these latter variables are positively
correlated with education. The weak and ambiguous effect of education is
consistent with the theoretical analysis, for an increase in education has off-
setting effects on the probability of dissolution (see implication (3) in
Section 1.6).
Earnings are consistently negatively related to the probability of
divorce up to an earnings level of at least $25,000, and become positively
related at high levels.4 Our theoretical analysis implies that a permanent
increase in earnings lowers the probability of divorce,44 and a greater
deviation between actual and expected earnings increases the probability
(see implication (1) and (2) in Section 1.6). Since men with greater
deviations in earnings are concentrated at both tails of the distribution
of actual earnings, dissolutions would be especially high at the lower tail
both because expected earnings are low and the deviations are large; they would
then decline as actual earnings rose, but could begin to rise at the upper
tail because the positive effect of large deviations could begin to outweigh
the negative effect of high expected earnings. Therefore, our theoretical
analysis can readily explain the initially strong negative and eventually
positive relation between actual earnings and the probability of divorce.
To test this interpretation, we have re-estimated the regressions,
replacing the variables E and E2 by variables measuring expected earnings
(E) and the absolute value of unexpected earnings (IE -El). The implied
effects of different measures of these two variables are shown in Table 2.
Expected earnings has the predicted negative effect on dissolutions and
unexpected earnings has a smaller but also predicted positive effect, although
the results are quite sensitive to the measure used.32a
Table2.Implied effects on the probability of divorce in five-year intervals of
increases In predicted earnings and in unexpected earnings, SEO white
men, aged 35-55.(Estimated from marriage-duration specific OLS regres-
sions which hold Age at Marriage and Age constant.)
Marriage Interval
0—5 years5-10 years10-15 years 15-20 years20-25 years
$,000increasein:
-2.87* -1.42* -3.22* -.40 -3.32*
E1
jE -ElI .56 .20 .68 •41 .20
£2 2.40 -1.02* -1.54* -1.45* -1.90*
-
£21 .40 .06 .40 .04 .15
£3 -1.63* .88 -1.28* .61 -1.04
—
£31 .47 .10 .45 .31 —.01
E1 = f1 (schooling, experience,experience2, marital status).
E2 =f2(schooling, experience, experience2, weeks worked).
E3 = f3 (schooling, experience,experience2).
E1 and E2 are computed at age 45, for actual marital status and weeksworked respectivel'y
IE-
Eliand IE E21are computed at actual age, marital status, and weeks worked,
respectively.
*jndjcates the coefficient's t-statistic exceeded 2.0
-
Seefootnote 45forfurther discussion of expected and unexpected earnings.33
Afurther analysis decomposed unexpected earnings into positive and
negative deviations, and unexpectedly high as well as unexpectedly low earnings
raise the probability of divorce,l+6 which adds additionalsupport to our
interpretation.
More direct evidence on the effect of unexpected events on theprobability
of divorce is available from other studies, and itsupports our interpretation
of the findings with respect to earnings. A spell ofunemployment often
indicates longer—run difficulties in the labor market that were notanticipated
at the time of marriage. Our analysis then implies that persons experiencing
extended unemployment would tend to have relatively high probabilities of
divorce. Ross and Sawhill (1975, p. 56) find that men who experienced serious
unemployment in the prior three years had a significantly higher probability
of divorce over the subsequent five years.
Fertility impairment is not easily identified prior to marriag&, hence
couples who experience sterility, spontaneous abortions or stillbirths should
be more likely to divorce. There is some evidence that women with relatively
many fetal losses or child deaths are more likely to have married more than
once. Excessivefecundity is also difficult to predict and couples who
have children too easily are expected to have higher probabilities of divorce.
Our results in the next section also support this implication.
Individuals whose health changed significantly from what it was prior
to marriage should also be more likely to divorce since health changes are
usually difficult to anticipate. According to evidence from the NBER-Thorn-
dike-Hagen Sample, men who report their health as either better or worse than
as young men are more likely to be divorced than are men who report their
health has remained about the same.l+8 These results cannot be explained3k
solely by a negative effect of marital instability on health because they
hold also (although less strongly) for persons whose health has improved.
Although the coefficients of determination in the regressions presented
in Tables 1 aI)d 2 are all very low (they are generally under .025 and several
are under .01), low R2's are common and are even to be expected in regressions
with dummy dependent variables.4 What is more important is that many of the
estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant even at the
.99 level of confidence (the large sample size partly explains this). Instead
of relying exclusively on t—values and R2's, we have tried to determine in a
more intuitive way whether the independent variables can discriminate among
persons who divorce early, later or never. Three separate probabilities of
divorce are predicted using the regression coefficients for each interval
and the mean values of the independent variables for men (1) divorcing in
that interval, (2) divorcing in a later interval, and (3) still maritally
stable (by 1967).
These predictions are shown in Table 3. As expected, they are lowest
for men still first married and highest for men who divorced in that interval.
The percentage differences are reasonably large, even between the two groups
who were not divorced in the interval for which the regression was estimated.
Therefore, the independent variables in these regressions can discriminate
between the maritally more stable and less stable.
The theoretical analysis implies that the probability of dissolution
declines with marriage duration (see implications (5) and (7), Section 1.6).
Table 1 indicates that the proportion of marriages ending by dissolution
declines with duration from 3.5 percent in the first four-year interval to

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































variables in Table 1 do have their strongest effect in the first interval.50
If we assume, nevertheless, that the explanatory variables had the same effects
on the probability of divorce at each duration of marriage, their effects
could be estimated by a pooled regression using each five-year interval as a
separate observation. Such a regression has been estimated while including
dummy variables to capture the differences in level of divorce in each five-
yearinterval.51 The effects of the explanatory variables implied by this
regression are indicated in Column 7 of Table 1. The duration dummy variables
(not shown) imply a substantial decline in the probability of divorce between
the first two five—year intervals and little change thereafter;52 this closely
mirrors the actual decline in divorce rates, which indicates that the decline
with duration is not closely related to changes with duration in our other
explanatory variables.
The coefficients in Column 7 of Table 1 estimate the effects of different
explanatory variables on the cumulative probability of divorce during the first
25 years when the effects are constrained to be independent of marriage dura
tiori. The coefficients in columns 1-5 of Table 1, on the other hand, estimate
these effects without constraining them.53 The cumulative probabilities of
divorce during the first 25 years implied by these unconstrained coefficients
are shown in column 6 of Table A comparison of column 6 with column 7
indicates that the estimated cumulative impact of age at marriage and earnings
(but not age or education) are much larger when the effects are not constrained
to be independent of marriage duration.
Women. The following OLS regression was estimated separately for each




















where0, AM, S and A are the woman's divorce dummy, age at marriage, schooling
level and age, defined the same as for the men in the preceding section, and
where:
P = 1if the first birth occurred less than seven months after
the date of the marriage;
C1 =thenumber of children under age 6 at the beginning of each
specific five-year marriage interval;
C2 =thenumber of children between the ages of 6 and 17 at the
beginning of that interval;
C3 =thenumber of children over age 17 at the beginning of that
interval
Unlikethe regressions for men, the regressions for women do not include
earnings (since many of these married women did not work in 1967), but they
do include the number of children at the beginning of each interval, and a
premarital pregnancy variable. Therefore, the regressions for women do contain
variables (the children variables) that explicitly measure behavior subsequent
to marriage. Consequently, the coefficients in the women's regressions, unlike
those in the men's regressions, measure the effect of a variable like age at
marriage net of its effect on the number and ages of children.
Table 4 summarizes these regression results.6 The effects of age at
marriage and education are similar to those found for men in Table 1. For
example, a woman's age at marriage also has a negative (and enera1ly stronger)
significant non-linear effect on the probability of divorce.57 Women's
schooling, like that of men has a statistically insignificant and quantita-36a
Table 4.Implied effects on the probability of divorce in five—year intervals, SEO
white women, age 35-55,(Estimatedfrom marriage-duration specific OLS
regress ions.)
Marriage interval















































Marry at 20 instead of 15:-4.2*
Marry at 25 instead of 20:-2.4*
Marry at 30 instead of 25:-0.4*
Marry at 35 instead of 30:+1.4*
Schooling: 4 additional years: -0.4
Age: 10 years younger in 1967: +0.4
Premarital conception: +1.2

















Means and standard deviations of variables used in the








10-15 years15-20 years20-25 years
3.55(18.5) 2.35(15.2) 1.98(13.9)












2.61 (3.2) 6. 49 (7 .2)
'indicates the coefficient's t-statistic exceeded 2.0. The effects of children are
evaluated at the variable's mean value.
9.13(10.7) 11.28(14.2)37
tivelysmall effect that varies in sign.
A premarital conception has a large effect on theprobability of
divorce in the first four intervals, although it isstatistically significant
only in the second interval. (We have no explanation for the negativesign in
the fifth interval.) We argued that an accidental premaritalconception
would increase the probability of dissolution because it would raisethe
cost of finding a suitable mate (see Section 1.3 and implication (6) in
section 1.6).
The number of children under age six has a large andusually statistically
significant effect on the probability of divorce. A child by the 15th month
of a marriage lowers the probability of divorce within the first fiveyears
of marriage by one percentage point, or by about 25percent of the mean (even
holding constant the premarital pregnancy variable). The effect ofyoung
children on the probability of divorce, in the second and third Intervals is
non—linear: for example, the first child underage six at the fifth year of
the marriage lowers the probability of divorce in the next fiveyears by about
2.1 percentage points; a second child further lowers itby 1.2 percentage
points; third and fourth children have small marginal effects, -0.3percent
and +0.7 percent respectively, while a fifth childappears to raise the
probability by 1.6 percentage points! The positive effect of a relatively
large number of children appears to support our theoretical prediction that
a greater deviation between actual and expected values of a characteristic
(including control over conception) raises the probability of dissolution
(See implication (2) in Section 1.6).
An older child (age 6-17) has a much weaker effect on the probabilities
of dissolution than does ayoung child (+0.1 and -0.3 compared to -1.2 and38
-1.1 in the third and fourth intervals respectively). Our theory implies
that children reduce the probability of dissolution because they represent
marital—specific capital (see implication (5) in Section 1.6); the weaker
effect of older children also is consistent with this implication because
younger children embody more marital-specificcapital.59
Indeed, even the positive effect of children over age 17 observed in
the fifth Interval is consistent with the theory. Parents sometimes postpone
dissolution until their children are older and the specific capital embodied
in them reduced. This interpretation has the implication that the positive
effect observed for older children would be largest when there were no
younger children.In regressions that introduce interaction terms between
C1, C2, and C3, the effect of C3 is largest when C1=
C2
=0.
There has been surprisingly little quantitative evidence on the effect
of children on divorce rates, although the relation between children and
divorce has long been recognized. Some have argued that childless couples have
higher divorce rates,60 but the evidence to date is very imperfect, consisting
of such aggregate statistics as the percent of divorces involving no children,
or the average number of children Involved indivorce.61 With much more
detailed evidence, we find large effects of children, although these effects
are not linear with respect to either number orage:62 younger children dis-
courage divorce more than older children do and the first two children dis-
courage divorce more than additional children do.
11.2 Search Costs and the Probability of Divorce
Evidence from several studies indicates that discrepancies in the traits
of mates (relative to that implied by the hboptimalu sorting) increase the39
probability of dissolution. For example, considerable sociological literature
has, for decades, emphasized that religious differences encourage dissolution;
Landis (1949) and Bell (1938) found that the probability of dissolution was
about 10 percentage points higher for a person married outside his or her
religion. Differences in education and in age also appear to increase the
probability of dissolution.6
The SEQ survey is not useful in studying the effects of discrepancies
because no information was collected on the traits of former spouses. The
Terman survey64 does provide such infrmation and Michael (1976) has related
the probability of divorce to the subject's age, education, and religion,
and to the spouse's education and religion. Five separate dummy variables,
one for each religion (including no religion), measure whether or not the
Terman subject and her spouse had the same religion. Results for women reported
in Table 5 indicate that all five religion variables have large and statistically
significant coefficients for divorces obtained early in marriage. The probab-
bility of divorce within the first four years of marriage is more than 20 per-
centage points lower when both have the same religion than when they differ.
With the exception of Jewish marriages, the effects are about as large,
although not as statistically significant, for divorces obtained within the
first 24 years of marriage.
We showed in the theoretical section that the traits of mates differ
more from what they would be in the ''optimal'' sorting when their marital
search costs are larger (see Section 1.3). We also showed that the probability
of dissolution is greater when search costs are larger, or when the discrepancy
between the actual and "optimal" traits is greater (see implication (6),
Section 1.6). The results in Table 5 for the Terman women on religious39 a
Table 5: OLS regression estimates of the probability of divorce by
19140 and by 1960 for women first married 1-k years prior















Source: Michael (1976, p. 28)
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114 114differences and the related results mentioned above are all consistent with
this impiication.6
Additional evidence also suggests that persons who intermarry tend to
have higher search costs, and do not simply have different tastes or less luck
in their search. A study of Jews in Indiana showed that the fraction inter-
marrying has been much greater in communities with relatively few Jews (where
the cost of finding a satisfactory Jewish mate is greater) than in communities
with relatively many Jews.66 There is also evidence that persons who marry
relatively young are more likely to intermarry than are persons who marry at
average ages. Our theoretical analysis implies that persons marrying at
young ages have less information about themselves and the marriage market
(see Section 1.3). Hence their high dissolution and intermarriage rates are
related: both are reflections of their limited information.68 This evidence
on intermarriage supports our interpretation of the relation between dissolu-
tion and age at marriage.6
Perhaps the most telling evidence comes from second and later marriages.
If the propensity to intermarry is partly the result of higher search costs,
and if these higher costs persist in the remarriage market, divorced persons
who intermarried in the first marriage should tend to intermarry in subsequent
marriages, and should have relatively high dissolution rates in their later
marriages. The religion—intermarriage rates of Terman subjects in their first
three marriages are presented in Table 6.More than one-half of the Terman women
and one—third of the Terman men who remarried after dissolving a first marriage
with someone from a different religion, again married outside of their own
religion. This is not only much higher than the fraction of religion-inter—
marriages in all first marriages, but is also considerably higher than the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































from the same religion. Since our theory implies that persons whodivorce
tend to have higher search costs, they should have a relatively high rateof
intermarriage in later marriages. The data in Table 6 are consistentwith
this implication.
There is evidence that previously divorced Jews intermarry more frequently
than Jews marrying for the firsttime.7° Moreover, the Rosenthal (1970) study
suggests that the relatively high intermarriage rate on remarriagesof divorced
persons is not a necessary consequence of remarriage,for Jewish widows do not
have a high intermarriage rate on their remarriages; indeed, it is even lower
than that of persons marrying for the first time!
We argued earlier that intermarriage is higher among Jews living in
communities with relatively few Jews because they have higher costs of finding
suitable Jewish mates. Put differently, being Jewish in these communities
is a rare trait that raises the cost of search, and as a result, raises the
discordance in traits between mates, and raises the dissolution rate (see
Section 1.3). The Terman sample was selected on the basis of a rare trait,
a high IQ: far less than one percent of the population has an IQexceeding
the average of this sample (1148). The expectation from our theory is, there-
fore, that Terman subjects would both marry out of their IQ class (theywould
"intermarry" with respect to IQ) and divorce at relatively high rates,unless
they were much more efficient searchers in the marriage market.
Unfortunately, information on the IQ's of the Terman subject's spouses
is quite limited, but available evidence is consistent with our expectation.
The average score on a "concept mastery" test of spouses was about one standard
deviation lower than the average score for Terman subjects, even when schooling
level was held constant (see Terman, 1959, pp. 57-60). A regression of the42
spouse's score on the subject's score has a standard error exceeding 1/3 of
the score of the spouses.7'It is not surprising to find, therefore, that
Terman subjects have had high divorce rates: 27 percent of Terman women had
been divorced from their first husbands by 1972.72
Since the wage rates of mates are negatively correlated in the "optimal"
sorting (see Becker, 19714), and since women typically earn less than men, a
discrepancy between mates in this trait would generally take the form of an
increase in the relative wage rate of the wife. Our theory implies that the
dissolution rake would be higher when her relative wage rate is higher,73 an
implication supported by considerable evidence. For example, Ross and Sawhill
(1975, p. 56) find that each $1,000 increase in the earnings of wives, holding
constant the earnings of their husbands and other variables, increases the
probability of divorce in the subsequent five years by about 1 percentage
point. The evidence on Terman subjects' divorces by 1960 in Table 5 is also
relevant, for the schooling coefficient of Terman women is significantly posi-
tive, and that of their husbands significantly negative, and schooling and
wage rates (not included in the regression) are positively correlated.14
Interesting additional evidence comes from the effects of welfare payments
on dissolutions.75 Welfare conditioned on the household's income is the poor
woman's alimony, and like a higher wage rate for women, reduces the gain from
marriage by increasing the expected income while unmarried. Consequently
welfare would reduce the gain from remaining married, and indeed, Honig (19714)
finds that the fraction of both white and black households headed by females
in different SMSA's is strongly related to the size of welfare payments.
(More generally, any system of transfers in which payments mainly depend on
a household's total income —-beit welfare, negative income tax, or aidL3
tofamilies with dependent children ——encouragesmarital dissolutions because
it compensates for the reduction in resources available to the spouses as a
consequence of dissolution.)6
11.3 Fertiliti and the Probability of Divorce
In Table liwereported a strong relation between the probability of
divorce and the number and ages of children, and we presumed that the causation
ran from children to marital stability. However, an exogenous increase in the
expected probability of divorce would reduce the demand for children, and for
other marital-specific capital as well (see Section I.'4 and implication (5)
in 1.6). So this argument implies that a negative correlation between number
of children and the probability of dissolution might reflect, instead, causation
from a higher probability to fewer children.
Usually, the relative importance of different directions of causation
is determined by estimating a simultaneous equation model that includes coef-
ficients reflecting each direction. Such a model could be constructed to
identify the causation between children and dissolution, but we decided
against this strategy since the SEO survey contains no information on the
first spouses of persons who dissolved their first marriages, while the
Terman survey contains only limited relevant information, and neither survey
contains information on any other kind of marital-specific capital. Instead,
we have attempted to study the causation from the probability of dissolution
to the demand for children by constructing a situation (by sample selection)
which largely excludes the reverse causation.
Couples with higher probabilities of dissolution tend to have less
invested in marital-specific capital not only in the early years of marriage
when dissolutions are more frequent, but in later years as well both because
dissolution rates differ then also, and because they would not fully compensate44
later for reduced investment earlier. Building on this argument, we relate
the number of children of intact couples to several determinants of their
probability of dissolution, and to (other) determinants of their demand for
children. We have restricted the analysis to couples who have essentially
completed their child-bearing in order to circumvent the sizeable random and
other transitory determinants of the timing of births.
From the SEO sample, white women age 40-55 with first marriage intact
were selected. The number of children ever born was regressed on a set pf
independent variables which includes several generally used in fertility
equations and three variables intended to reflect the probability of divorce --
discrepanciesbetween spouses in race, education level and age. Race is
defined as a dummy variable equal to zero if the spouses are not of the same
race and one if they are. The education and the age variables are defined
as the cross-product of the education levels and of the ages of the spouses
respectively; the discrepancy is greater the smaller these cross-products.77
The race and cross-product variables are expected to have positive coefficients
on fertility because smaller discrepancies in traits result in a lower probability
of dissolution and thus a higher demand for children.This regression is
reported in Table 7. The education cross-product does have a powerful positive
coefficient. Racealsohasa significant positive effect: racially mixed
couples tend to have one child fewer than other couples with the same other
measured characteristics. The coefficient for the age cross-product is
counter to our prediction, but its statistical significance ss1ight
Other studies have also found that the interaction between the education
of mates or sometimes the interaction between husband's income and wife's
education has a positive effect on fertility.79 The interaction between IQ's1+Lia
Table 7: Regression on number of children of women with intact






Age of Wife 0.0714
(1.23)
Education of Husband -0.200
(_7jL)
Education of Wife -0.19
(-7.014)
Wage of Husband -0.006
(-1.05)
Age Married, Wife -0.100
(-2.38)
(Age Married, Wife)2 -0.0001
(-0.15)










also appears to affect fertility (see Garrison-Anderson-Reed [1968]) "...pre-
sumably for the same reasons [that explain the similar results of education]
whatever they may be." (p. 124). We have supplied a reason: couples whose IQ's
or educations or other traits differ from what they would be in the optimal
sorting have fewer children because they have a greater probability of dissolution.
Willis (1974) and Ben-Porath (1974) argue that the interaction between education
levels has a positive effect on fertility because the value of the wife's time
is inversely related to the degree of interaction. This may well contribute
to the explanation of the findings on education and IQ but, unlike our argument,
is not relevant to the related finding that discrepancies in race (discussed
above) and religion (discussed below) also reduce fertility.
Additional evidence is available from a regression of the number of
children ever born to Terman women (who first married prior to 1940 and whose
marriage was still intact in 1960) on several variables including a dummy
variable defined as one if the spouses were of the same religion. That religion
variable has a sizeable effect: the number of children is reduced by about .7
if spouses have different religions, which is more than one third of the
average number of chi ldren in this sample (the coefficient's t—value =1.83).
We showed in the previous section that Terman women are much more likely to
divorce when they marry someone outside of their religion, so these data also
indicate that the demand for children is lower among couples with a relatively
high probability of dissolution.
This section has adduced strong evidence of causation running from the
probability of dissolution to the demand for children: a higher probabil ity
reduces the demand. There is a little evidence also that the demand for other
kinds of marital-specific capital is reduced as well.8° Direct quantitative
evidence, as opposed to the indirect evidence in Table 4, of causation runningfrom children to the probability of dissolution is available in the evidence
below on remarrieges and dissolution of second marriages.
11.1+ Remarriage
Divorced persons in the United States can remarry again if they choose to,
and the overwhelming majority eventually do. The SEO sample is typical; more than
75 percent of divorced men and more than 70 percent of divorced women remarried
within 15 years of their divorce. The word "eventually" needs to be emphasized,
however, because remarriage is far from immediate. Only 30 percent of the SEO
men and 23 percent of the women remarried within two years of their divorce, and
only 8 and 3 percent, respectively, remarried within fiveyears.81
Our theoretical analysis impl les that the probability of remarriage is
greater when the expected gain from marriage is greater as a result eitherof
lower search costs or greater gains in the "optimal" sorting (see implication
(8) in Section 1.6). As a test of this implication, the probability ofremar
riage of divorced men and women in the SEO survey was related to several
measures of the expected gain. The calculations in Table 8 were derived from
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if
the person had remarried by the nth year after the termination of their first
marriage (n =2,5, 10, and 15 in the four regressions used in Table 8).82
Higher earnings for men significantly increase the probability of
remarriage at all four durations.8 This is further evidence that the expected
gain from marriage is increased by an increase in men's earnings (see implica-
tion (1) in Section 1.6), evidence that is consistent with the findings that
an increase in earnings reduces both the probability of divorce (Table 1)
and the age at marriage (Keeley, 1971,).
Persons divorced from marriages with relatively large expected gains
would tend to have been married longer than other divorced persons because46a
Table 8.Implied effects on the cumulative probability of remarriage in specified
intervals; SEO white men and women aged 50-65 (estimated from OLS regressions''.
A: MALES







































age 35 instead of 30:
age 40 instead of 35:
age 45 instead of 40:
Schooling: four additional years:
Earnings: $4000 additional:
Duration of first marriage:




Age: 10 years younger in 1967 2.8 0.8 -1.6
Widowed in first marriage —8.2 3.3 -7.8
Regression F 3.02 2.39 2.78
Sample size 354 310 261
Means and standar.d deviationsofvariablesused in theregressions:












































































"Indicates the coefficient's t-statistic exceeded 2.0
+ b8W+U.
Age at divorce: -7.3 -7.fl age 35 instead of 30: -1.5 -5.0?
-11.2* —11.0*
age 40 instead of 35: -6.14*
—114.4
age 145 instead of 40: —3.2 -7.9 -15.0*
Schooling: four additional years: -1.4 -1.0 —0.7 -3.2
Children:
One child -9.0* 33.7 35.3 -26.9
—0.5 Each additional child: —l.I4; -1.3
Duration of first marriage
5.6* lasted five years longer: 2L,* 3.7*
Age: 10 years younger in 1967: 6.8* 2.8 0.8 9.5
Widowed in first marriage -12.0* -9.3 -10.0* -114.0*
Regression F 11.21 114.71 13.13 9.71
Sample size 991 861 684 536
Means and standard deviationsofvariablesused intheregressions:
Age divorced (AD)
School ing (s) 9.9
(3.3)
Children from first marriage (C) 1.9
(1.9)
Duration of first marriage (Dur)
Age (A)
No children (dummy =1if
no children) (NC)
Widowed (dummy -1if widowed) (w)







































.632 .592 .525 .466
(0.50) (o.48) (0.49)
.124 .294 .474 .621
(0.49)17
more time is required to accumulate a sufficient amount of adverse information
to offset larger expected gains (see Sections 1.3 and implication (8) In 1.6).
Hence the length of the first marriage can be used as a proxy for the expected
gain,81+ and should be positively related to the probability of marriage. Table
8 strongly confirms this: the probability of remarriage is raised by about five
percentage points for men and somewhat less for women when the first marriage
lasts five years longer.
Education has a small positive, but statistically insignificant effect
on the probability of iemarriage for men, and an even weaker negative effect
on that for women.8 These results are consistent with the weak effect of
education on the probability of divorce (see Tables 1 and 1+), and with the
implication that an increase in education has offsetting effects on the
expected gain from marriage (see implication (3) in Section 1.6).
An increase in age at divorce reduces the probability of remarriage for
both men and women with this distinction: the coefficients are all negative
in the regressions for women, and many are sizeable and statistically signifi-
cant, while none of the coefficients formen are statistically significant,
and some are positive. The more pronounced negative effect for women is
presumably partly related to the closer connection for women between age and
child-bearing capacity, and partly to the steep decline with age in the
ratio of unmarried men to women.86
The probability of remarriage appears to be higher for divorced
persons than for widows: the widow dummy variable has a large negative
effect on the probability of remarriage that is statistically significant
for women. This would not be consistent with our analysis if, as seems 1 ikely,
widows gain more from marriage than divorced persons; after all, persons do
not usually become widowed principally because their marriage was not
successful48
Thedummy variabledistinguishingwidows fromdivorcees implicitly
assumes that they have been in the "remarriage market" equally long when the
elapsed times from legal termination of their first marriages have been equal.
Yet many divorced persons begin looking for another mate as soon as they
separate, and someseparateonly after they have found another mate.88 At
least part of the separated time of divorcees should be included, therefore,
when calculating their length of stay in the remarriage market. Since the
SEO survey did not ask for the date of separation, we have reestimated the
regressions underlying Table 8 after simply subtracting two years from the
date of divorce, although the separated time of most divorced persons may
well exceed two years.8 The probability of remarriage in these revised
regressions (not shown here) is no longer smaller for widows; indeed, the
coefficient of the widow variable is usually positive, although never statisti-
cally significant.9°
An explicit estimate of the effect of separation can be derived from
the Terman survey as it includes information about the length of separation
during the first marriage. The time interval between the legal termination
of the first marriage and the comencement of the second marriage, for the
small number of Terman subjects in their second marriage in 1950, was regressed
on the length of separation, a dummy indicating how the first marriage ended
(widowed =1),and other variables used in the analysis of the SEQ data. The
results in Table 9 indcate that widows do remarry more quickly than divorced
persons --thecoefficient for men is statistically significant91 --whenthe
length of separation and other variables are held constant. Moreover, as we
expected, persons do appear to use their time while separated to search for
another mate: both men and women remarried more quickly when they were separated
longer.49
Children from the first marriage significantly reduce the probability
that women remarry during any given period of time since legal termination
of their first marriage (Panel B of Table 8), and increase the time it takes
to remarry for those who do (Table 9) .Theevidence in Table 8 suggests that
the number of children is less important than the presence of any children.
Our theory does imply that chi idren reduce the gain from remarriage because
they are specific to the first marriage, and they raise the cost of searching
for another mate because they raise the shadow price of the mother's time (see
Section 1.5 and implication (5) in Section 1.6) .Wesay "mother's time" because
the children of divorced parents usually live with their mothers. Consequently
children from their first marriage should not have much effect on the propen-
sity to remarry for divorced men; Table 9 indeed shows that whereas children
significantly raise the duration of time to remarriage of Terman women, they
have no such effect on the Terman men.93
One immediate implication of this evidence on the effects of children
is that divorced men are more likely to remarry partly, perhaps evenmostiy,1+
because divorced women usually retain custody of the children. We have crudely
estimated the effect of custody by comparing the probability of remarriage of
SEO men in different remarriage intervals with a probability predicted for
women with no children.95 The results are quite instructive. The actual
frequencies of remarriage two years after the end of the first marriage are
31 percent for SEO men and 22 percent for SEO women. The predicted frequency
for women with no children is 1+2 percent, considerably above the actual prob-
96 ability for men!
The causation in the observed negative relation between children and
remarriage rates rather clearly runs from additional children in the first
marriage to a lower probability of remarrying. This supplements the evidence





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of dissolution to additional children.It also reinforces our contention in
Section 11.1 that the observed negative relationship between children and the
probability of dissolution has an important component that runs from additional
children to a higher probability of remaining married.
11.5 StabIlity of Second and Higher-Order Marriages
We have pointed out that more than three—quarters of persons whose first
marriage ends in divorce in the United States eventually remarry; many also
divore a second time. Some remarry a third time, etcetera. Using divorce
and marriage records from the state of Iowa, Monahan (1958, 1959) finds that
the probability of divorce increases sharply with the order of marriage for
persons previouslydivorced97 but not for persons previously widowed.
Since these data and most others used in studying second and third
marriages are not standardized for age at marriage, age, or even duration
married, the higher probability of divorce in higher-order marriages might
be easily explained primarily by the increase in age at marriage or the
decline in the average duration married as the order of the marriageincreased.8
A major advantage of the SEO data is that different order marriages can be
compared after standardization for age, age at marriage, duration married, and
other variables. However, few persons divorced more than once even in the
large SEO survey, so the evidence on second and third marriage divorces is
based on quite small samples.
Regressions on the probability of divorce are run with the SEO data,
including higher order as well as first marriages. These regressions duplicate
those shown in Table 1 for men and Table 4 for women, except that we have
pooled experiences on second marriages with those on first marriages for the
women and have pooled experiences on second and third marriages with those on51
first marriages for the men.99In these pooled regressions two dummy variables
were added. The first indicates a previous marriage (defined as one if the
observation pertains to a second or third marriage) and the other indicates
a previous widowing (defined as one if the first marriage ended in widowhood).
Table 10 gives the coefficients on these two dummy variables only, taken from
the full multiple regression equation.0°
The main findings of Monahan and others apparently continue to hold
even after the standardizations introduced in these regressions. For women,
second marriages are much more unstable than first marriages, especially during
the first five years of marriage: the probability of divorce is about 114 per-
centage points higher on the second than on the first marriage. Moreover,
aside from the first five-year interval, the probability of divorce for widows
is no greater than for women in their first marriage.
The behavior of the Terman women is also tons istent with these results.
By 1972, when they were about 60 years old, 27 percent had been divorced from
their first husbands. More than 55 percent of the women who divorced the
first time and remarried had divorced again --abouttwice the divorce rate
from first marriages --comparedto 38 percent of the (just 8) women who were
widowed the first time and had remarried. Only 12 women were married a
third time. Forty percent (14) of those (10) who had been divorced from both
previous marriages were divorced again, whereas neither of the two previously
widowed women were divorced from their marriage.
The results for men in Table 10 are similar: second and third marriages
of divorced men are more unstable than first marriages of men, again especially
during the initial years. Widowers are less likely to divorce after remarriage





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the probability of divorce is no greater for widowers than for men in their
102
first marriage.
Our theory implies that previously divorced persons gain, on average,
less than others from subsequent marriages (See Section 1.5 and implication
tion (9) in Section 1.6). Since the selection of widows is more independent
of their gains from first marriage (see the evidence in the previous section),
we also expect marriages containing previously widowed persons to be more
stable than those containing previously divorced persons.
Consider now the duration to divorce. By extension of the previous
argument, the expected gain from marriage tends to be smaller for persons
previously divorced twice than for those divorced only once, and still smaller
for those divorced three times, and so on. Hence the average duration to
divorce of those terminating their marriage should decline with marriage order
(because less time is required to accumulate sufficient adverse information
when the expected gain is smaller). This can explain Monahan's evidence of
a significant decline with marriage order in the average duration to divorce
for persons previously divorced103 but not previously widowed.It can also
explain the positive relation between the duration of the first marriage
and the probability of remarriage (see Tables 8 and 9), and the evidence in
Table 10 that the probability of divorce on second and third marriages is
especially high during the first few years of marriage.
When the SEO data are not standardized for age and age at marriage
(Monahari's data were not standardized for these variables), they also indicate
that among those who divorce, the length of time from marriage to divorce
declines significantly from first marriage to second marriage. However, when
the data are standardized for age and age at current marriage, the average53
101+ durationis no longer related to marital order. Consequently, when
appropriately standardized, the SEO data do not support our prediction that
duration-to-divorce will decline in'higher-order marriages.
We also ran regressions (not shown) with the SEO dataon the propensity
to divorce from second marriages alone, using independent variables similar
to those used for first marriages (see Tables I and 4). Since fewpersons had
divorced from a second marriage (for example, only 13 men divorced withinthe
first five years of their second marriage), the statisticalsignificance of
most coefficients is quite low. Yet, the results are generally consistent
with those for first marriages. For example, an increase in theearnings
of men seems to reduce their propensity to divorceon second as well as first
marriages, again except perhaps when earnings are quite high. An increase
in education has weak and inconsistent effectson the propensity to divorce;
as in the results for first marriages, the effect is slightly positive for
women.
An interesting new result for women is shown in Table 11: children from
a prior marriage appear to increase the probability of dissolution from the
current marrage,105 whereas children from the current marriageappear to
decrease this probability in second marriages, just as it does in first
marriages (cf. Table 4). Our explanation of both effects is that childrenare
marital specific capital: children from the current marriage increase and
children from prior marriages decrease the gain from the currentmarriage
(see implication (5) in Section 1.6).
The positive effect of children from prior marriages is further evidence
of causation from children to marital stability sincean exogenous increase
in the probability that a second marriage will dissolve wouldhardly raise
the demand for children in the first marriage. Thereis, however, also further53a
Table 11. OLS regressions on the probability of divorce
for women in second marriages, by marriage
interval (SEO white women age 15-65).
Explanatory
Marriageinterval(inyears)
variables 0-5 5-10 10-15 ,
—









Children from .1+4 .83 .52
1st marriage (.92) (1.62) (.92)
a2 .030 .027 .030
F 3.93 2.30 1.56
N 1032 752 508
t values in parenthesis
*Effectsof children are evaluated at the mean number
of children.
Other variables included were age, age at marriage and
its square, education, and a dummy variable indicating
whether the women had been widowed or divorced from their
first marriage.54
evidenceof causation from marital stability to children: there are fewer
children in higher order marriages in the SEO survey, even after age at
current marriage and duration of current marriage are held constant.6
Since the probability of dissolution increases with marital order, the
number of children would decline with order if the probability affects the
demand for children.
11.6 The Secular Trend in Divorce
The number of divorces has grown remarkably during the last 125 years
in all Western countries that permit divorce. For example, only two (!)
divorcesper year were granted in England between 1800 and 1850 (see Rhein-
stein, 1972, p. 31), whereas in the past year or so there have been approximately
1 million divorces a year in the U.S. Based on 1973 data it is estimated
that about 40 percent of new marriages in the U.S. will end in divorce (see
Preston, 1974). The reported divorce rate in the U.S. (the number of divorces
in the year per 1,000 married women age 15 and over) rose from 4.1 in 1900 to
8.0 by 1920 to 8.8 by 1940 to 9.2 in 1960 with sizable fluctuations around
both World Wars (the historic peak until the last few years had been 19k6
with a divorce rate of 17.9) (see Platens, 1973, p. 24). Since the mid—1960's
the divorce rate increase has accelerated; by 1970 the rate was 14.9 and by
1974, 19.3.107 We believe that the theoretical and empirical analyses in the
previous sections can contribute significantly to an understanding of these
trends and fluctuations, but here we only sketch out the main considerations.108
The number of children per family has been declining since the beginning
of the nineteenth century in the United States, and the decline accelerated
during the last 20 years. Our analysis implies both that a decline in the55
number of children increases the probability of divorce, and that an increase
in this probability reduces the demand for children (see implication (5) in
Section 1.6); the survey evidence above has confirmed that both directions
of causation are important (see especially Tables 4, 7, 8, 9, and 11). Presum-
ably both directions of causation also are at work in the secular decline in
fertility and secular rise in divorce. Note, however, that the recent accelerated
decline in fertility began in the 1950's, at least five years before the
accelerated increase in divorce.
An increase in the wages of women would reduce the gain from marriage,
even when, the wages of men increased at the same rate, because the sexual
division of labor between market and nonmarket activities would decrease, and
more married women would enter the labor force (see the evidence in Section 11.3).
Therefore, the secular growth in wages, which contributed significantly to the
growth in the labor force participation of women, especially married women,
probably also contributed significantly to the growth in divorce rates. Again
causation probably flows both ways: divorced women (and women who anticipate
divorce) have higher wages because they spend more time in the labor force (see
Section 11.4).
Legal access to divorce became much easier during the last 100 years in
the United States, Great Britain, and most other Western countries. Although
we believe this trend toward easier divorce has been mainly a response to the
increased demand for divorce,109 it may also have been responsible for a small
part of the growth in divorce. Whatever the causation, the ease of obtaining
a divorce and the fraction of women married are positively (not negatively)
correlated across states, even after age and many other variables are held
constant (see Freiden, 1974, and Santos, 1975).56
A growth in the divorce rate itself encourages additional divorces
because the remarriage market is better when there are more divorcedpersons
available. There is evidence in Table 8 that the remarriage market did
improve as the divorce rate grew over time, for the probability of remarriage
during the first few years after a divorce also grew over time.H0 Moreover,
the sharp acceleration in divorce rates that began in the 1960's may have been
partly caused by the prior growth in divorce rates, for if the process can be
described by a logistic or related function, the rate of growth would accelerate
for a while after the level became sufficiently high.
Even though an increase in male earnings or age at marriage significantly
reduces the probability of divorce when comparing different households at the
same period in time (see Section 11.1), the relation between the secular
increase in divorce rates and the secular changes in these variables is less
clear. An increase in the earnings of one man relative to the earnings
of other men in the marriage market increases his gain from marriage partly
because he is able to attract a woman with more desirable attributes (See
Section 1.2). On the other hand, when the earnings of all men increase, with
little change in the distribution of the attributes of women, all men cannot
be sorted with more desirable women. Consequently, an increase in the earnings
of any man would have a smaller effect on his gain from marriage and thus on
his probability of dissolution when the earnings of other men also increase.
A similar argument can be made for general increases in education levels, and.
a related argument can be made for a decline in the average age at marriage.
Therefore, the large secular growth in male earnings may not have greatly
reduced, and the secular decline in age at marriage may not have greatly increased,
the propensity to divorce.57
Tables I and 1providesome evidence on the trend in probability of
divorce. The estimated trend is measured by the coefficient on age, but its
interpretation across marriage intervals is subject to several qualifications.1
While nearly all the estimated trends are positive, the only significant one
suggests an increase in the probability of divorce of about 1 percent per
decade over the time span covered by the SEO data (1920's to early 1960's).
These estimates of the trend in divorce rates are net of standardizations for
trends in age at marriage, years of schooring, earnings of men and the number
and ages of children born to women. These standardized estimates may be
biased because, as we already mentioned, standardizing with differences across
households in earnings, education, or age at marriage does not correctly
provide for the effect of secular changes in these variables.2 Moreover,
these estimates have not been corrected for the effect of change over time
in the earnings of women, divorce laws, the size of the remarriage market and
other variables that contributed to the observed trend in divorce rates.
Summary and Conclusions
The theory developed in Part I of this paper assumes that each person
maximizes his or her expected utility as he decides whether to marry or to
remain married. The relatively high utility expected when marrying is
reconciled with the relatively low utility expected when divorci.ng by
introducing imperfect information and deviations between real ized and
expected outcomes.
The probability of dissolution is greater when the expected gain from
marrige is smaller and the variance in the distribution of realized outcomes
is larger. Both the expected gain and variance depend on the cost of acquiring
additional infoirination about potential mates in the marriage market. The58
expected gain will decline as the cost increases because a person facing a
higher cost is induced to accept a less-favorable marriage offer, i.e., a mate
with characteristics that are further away from the optimal characteristics in
the equilibrium—sorting with perfect information. The variance will increase
as tha cost increases because a person facing a higher cost is induced to
accept a mate about which he or she has less information.
The expected gain from marriage also depends systematically on the level
of different characteristics.For example, an increase in the intelligence
or attractiveness of men or women or the earnings of men tends to raise the
gain, whereas an increase in the earnings of women tends to lower the gain.
The accumulation of certain kinds of knowledge and capital such as sexual
compatibility or children, that normally occurs with an increase in the duration
of a marriage, increases the expected gain from remaining married because such
marital-specific capital has less value if the marriage dissolves. Conversely,
a reduction in the expected gain from remaining married discourages the accumula-
tion of marital—specific capital.
The probability and speed of remarriage are positively related to the
expected gain from remarriage, which depends on earnings, age, number of
children from the previous marriage, and other characteristics. Divorced,
but not widowed, persons marrying for a second or third time are more likely
to dissolve their marriages, and tend to dissolve faster, than persons marry-
ing for the first time. The reason that they become divorced is partly
because they tend to gain relatively little from marriage, and partly because
becoming divorced in itself raises the probability of an additional divorce.
-
Manyof the more important theoretical implications are listed in Section
1.6. The empirical analysis using the 1967 SEO and 1920-1960 Terman data
strongly supports these implications and is also of considerable interest in its
own right.59
An increase in the expected earnings of men reduces the probabilityof
dissolution on first marriages, raises the speed and probabilityof remarriage
if the first is dissolved, and reduces the probability of dissolution on
second or higher order marriages. An increase in the expected earningsof
women, on the other hand, has the opposite effects:it appears to raise the
probability of dissolution and to reduce the propensity to remarry.This
evidence confi rms theoretical implication (1) in Section 1.6).
An increase in the number of children, especially younger children,
from a first marriage reduces the probability of dissolution of that marriage,
and the speed and probability of remarriage for mothers with custody.Indeed,
if divorced women did not usually receive custody, their propensity to remarry
would not be less than that of divorced men. There is a bit of evidence
that couples often delay their dissolution until their children are grown
(and embody less marital-specific capital). Although children from second
and higher order marriages also lower the probability of dissolution in
these marriages, children from first marriages apparently raise the insta
bilityof subsequentmarriages (See implication (5) in Section 1.6).
If a person marries outside of his religion, he is much more likely to
dissolve his marriage, to marry out of his religion if he does remarry, and
then to divorce again. Moreover, even if a divorced (but not a widowed)
person married in his religion the first time, he is ratherlikely to marry
outside his religion the second time. The propensity to marry outside of
one's religion, and then to dissolve the marriage, also appears to be
directly related to the relative number of potential mates of the same religion
that are available. This and considerable other evidence on intermarriage is
implied by our theoretical analysis (see implication (6) in Section1.6).60
An increase in the probability of dissolution, as measuredempirically
by the propensity to marry outside of one's religion,race, or education
class, reduces the demand for children (see Table 7) and for other marital-
specific capital, such as skills highly specialized to the nonmarketsector
(see implication (5), Section 1.6). Therefore, the observed negative
relation between the propensity to dissolve and children (and some other
kinds of marital specific capital) involves causation running in both directions.
Persons who marry relatively young are far more likely to dissolve their
marriages than are those who marry at "normal" ages. This has been well known,
but less well known is our finding that persons whomarry for the first time
relatively late -—forexample, in their early thirties --alsohave relatively
high probabilities of dissolution (see implication (4) in Section 1.6).
The propensity to remarry is positively related to male earnings, the
absence of young children, the length of time separated before legal termina-
tion of the first marriage, and the duration of the prior marriage,a variable
that serves as a proxy for unmeasured determinants of the expected gain from
marriage. Widowed men or women are more likely to remarry than are divorced
women or men, after allowance is made for age at legal termination of the
prior marriage, the length of time separated before legal termination, and
some other variables (see implication (8) in Section 1.6).
The probability of dissolution is much higher on second marriages, and
still higher on third marriages, forpersons previously divorced but not for
persons previously widowed (see implication (9) in Section 1.6). Although
our theory also predicts that the duration to divorce declines with marital
order for persons previously divorced, the empirical evidence is rather
ambiguous.61
Most of our empirical evidence involved different households at a moment
in time. Yet our limited examination of evidence on trends in divorce rates
suggests that our theory can also contribute significantly to understanding
and explaining the secular growth in divorce, including the acceleration
since the early 1960's. The most important variables appear to be the
decline over time in number of children, the growth in labor force participa-
tion and earning power of women, the growth in the breadth of the remarriage
market as more persons become divorced, and perhaps also the growth in legal
access to divorce and the growth in public transfer payments.
In many ways, marriage and divorce is a special case of a "contract'
of indefinite duration between two or more partners, such as business partners
or employees and their employer, that can be terminated under specific condi-
tions. A theoretical and empirical analysis of divorce is important not
only because the decision to divorce has significant effects on subsequent
behavior and well-being, but also indirectly because the evidence on
divorce is far more extensive and detailed than the evidence on the
termination of jobs, business partnerships, or other contracts.
We believe that our analysis of divorce further reveals the power of
"the economic approach" to clarify and illuminate demographic behavior.It
is, therefore, an additional contribution to the development of what has
recently been called "sociological economics": the application of economic
concepts and analysis to behavior at least partly outside the monetary sector.Becker, Landes, Michael: FOOTNOTES
1. Throughout this study we use the terms divorce and dissolution inter-
changeably and we do not distinguish in the theoretical section among
separation, annulment and divorce.
2. See Section 11.6 for details (especially footnote 107).
3. "Marriage is the only adventure open to the timid" (Voltaire), "mar-
riage be a lottery in which there are a wondrous many blanks. .
(Vanburgh),"marry in haste, and repent at ieisture" (Cabeii).(These
references are taken from Evans [1968]).
4. The solution can be formally developed with dynamic programming. Expected
income in the last (nth) period is maximized, given the realizations at
the end of the n-lst period by
IMaxEI(M;R ,u), n n n n—l n
where Rn_i represents the realizations at the end of n-i, and the
distribution of income in n partly depends on the marital decision (Mn)
made then and the random variable (u) realized in n. Similarly,
expected wealth in n-i is maximized by
I
W =MaxE[I (M ; R ,u )+ ] n—i n-in—i n—2 n—i i+r
MaxEI(M;R ,M ,u ,u) n n n—2 n—i n-i n =MaxE[Ii (Mi; R2,u1) + 1+r
where Un_i is reaiized in n-i. This process of maximizing expected weaith,
coritingenton the realizations of random variabies in the past, can
be continued backwards for au n periods.
5.During the 1950's and 60's the median duration of marriage prior to
divorce ranged between 5.8 years and 7.5 years in the U.S. (Platens
1973b, p. 39; and Platens, 1973a, p. 49). Regarding the percent
distribution of divorces by marriage duration from 1870 to 1967, see
Platens (1973b, p. 1+1).F2
6. See Platens (1973b, p. 19). Of course, a divorce might not be sought
if strong opposition were expected.
7. These implications are supported by evidence in Bartel (1975). Hashimoto
(1975) applies a model of combined maximization to the Seattle labor
market, with some empirical confirmation.
8. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the sex differential in age
at first marriage has greatly decined during the last 20 years; the
investments of women have become much less specialized to married life
as they reduced their childbearing and increasingly entered the labor
force (see Platens l973b, p. 55).
9. We say 'relatively" high earnings because we are considering only a
change in the earnings of some men relative to those of other men.
A change in the earnings of all men would have a weaker effect on the
gain from marriage than an equal change in relative earnings if charac-
teristics of women did not change much. We consider these differences
more systematically in our discussion of changes in marital dissolutions
over time (see Section 11.6).
10.Search theory was first applied to the marriage market by Keeley (l97L).
11.For more extensive discussion of this framework, see Wessels (1976).
12. Take a point A. to the right of A where
I >cG'+I -c=
Thenby substituting for I from the equation in the text, we have
2..ii I >1 +(ctG-aG).
Clearly, II must exceed I, for if II were less thanI, then cL'Gt would exceed
ctGt from a basic property of the distribution of offers, and the in-
equality could not hold.F3
13.If Am. were not the upper bound of
2.. 2..
II> V1 (1') m.2.. m.2..
I I I
2..




A .SinceAis the lower bound of A ,then m. 2.. m.
I I
< (2')
where 2.-L. refers to a woman with a trait slightly lower than A2.
Continuity of the income and value of search functions implies that
inequality (2') could not hold for traits arbitrarily close to A2. ,the
lower bound of Am ,ifinequality (1') held. Hence Am has to be the
upper bound of A2.
14. Jovanovic (1976) develops a model of intensive search along these lines
in the context of matching employees and firms, and derives these and
other implications.
15. Markets are sometimes organized in ways that facilitate marital search.
Examples include dances for tall persons, social activities centered around
a church, residential segregation of minorities, and co-educational univer-
sities that require considerable intelligence for admission.
16. Wessels (1976) shows that the region of acceptable offers is wider and the
probability of a "mismatch" greater when the distribution is less dense.
17. The effect of differences in search efficiency are less clearcut. Although
less efficient searchers make fewer searches, they spend less total time on
search only if the elasticity of the number of searches with respect to







where 10 is single income, 1a is the minimum acceptable, and 1mx is the
maximum possible income offer. Since it can be shown that dla <dl,an
increase in single income, with the distribution of offers held constant,
would reduce the expected gain, for
= -
1<0as long as dia <2d1.
If offers were not uniformly distributed, the magnitude of dH/d10 would
change,butit would still tend to be negative.




where K is the stock of specific capital, and y are the other
variables that affect dissolution. Also let the stock of specific





where x are other variables that affect this capital. Then if y changes
with x held constant,
dy ay DK ap dyF5
or
dy f h (3')
Therefore,
..2. f . ah >— since—and—<.0.
dy ay aK
Similarly, it can be shown that
dxax
20. Calculated from 1967 SEO data.
21. See, for example, the study by Kogut (1972) of the incidence and
stability of consensual unions in Brazil.
22. A shift to the right in the distribution of offers raises the expected
gain from marriage compared both to the minimum acceptable offer --which
also shifts to the right —-andto the "offer" from being single.
23. We distinguish between these effects in the empirical section.
24. Perhaps more persuasive evidence is that a significant fraction ofpersons
remarry shortly after their first marriage dissolves (see the empirical
evidence in Table 8).
25. Most widowed persons are considerably older and form a somewhat distinct
market.
26. We present some results in Section 11.4 on the effects of children on
remarri age.
27. Our earlier analysis shows that persons with lower expected gains from
marriage, such as men with low earnings and women with high earnings, or
persons who married out of their race or religion, have lower minimumF6
acceptable offers. Moreover, there is evidence that they are in fact
less likely to marry (see Section 11.4).
28. An analysis that rules out remarriage is much less applicable when the
minimum acceptable offer in the remarriage market greatly exceeds non-
married wealth. Our predictions about the relation between dissolution
rates and variables like search costs then become more ambiguous.
29. This difference in the average expected gain on first and second marriages
is reduced but not eliminated by the negative relation between the
propensity to remarry and the expected gain from remarriage (see footnote
27).
30. There is little reason to expect persons who were widowed the first
time to have a relatively high dissolution rate on their second marriage;
see the empirical evidence in Section 11.5.
31.In the same way, positive specific capital in one firm could lower
the productivity of a worker moving to another firm because he has
become "accustomed" to the first firm's methods and organization, and
has lost some of his "flexibility."
32.In the same way, separation from one job per se increases the turnover on
all subsequent jobs, which can contribute to the explanation of differences
in turnover rates between so-called "movers" and "stayers." Usually
differences in behavior between "stayers" and "movers" have been simply
taken as given and described (see, for example, Heckman—Willis 1975).
Our analysis probes into the underlying causes, and explains such
differences in behavior in marital and other markets by differences in
more basic characteristics, such as search costs, specific capital, proper-
ties of optimal sortings, and even luck.F7
33. Gi ick and Norton (1971, p. 308) discuss the strengths and weaknesses of
the SEQ data for the study of marital behavior. The weaknesses mentioned
include the discrepancy between SEO and CPS figures --theSEO shows a
higher proportion of adults currently divorced and a lower proportion
married. They suggest that the larger number of divorced in the SEQ
"may be closer to the true numbers than those in the CPS." Even so,
according to Glick and Norton, the divorces reported for 1960-66 fall
10 to 20 percent below the numbers reported to vital statistics. The
accuracy of the marital histories presented by the SEO data is, of course,
also subject to some reservation, but the inaccuracies may not be
systematically related to the variables analyzed here.
31k.All persons whose marriage ended by death of a spouse were excluded.
35. For wonn with more than four children ever born, the birth dates for
children other than the first •two and last two were interpolated at
equal intervals between the second and next-to—last child.
36. We have also used the maximum likelihood logit approach, and the
coefficients estimated are quite similar to the OLS estimates, even though
the mean of the dichotomous dependent marital variable is near zero.
Since the OLS and logit estimates are so similar, only OLS results are
reported.
37. The OLS regressions are shown in the Appendix. Since the number of
observations at later marital durations declines even more rapidly
when younger men are included in the study primarily because younger men
have not been exposed to longer durations, we have restricted most of
the analysis to persons in the 35—55 age group. Even here, the number of
observations declines about 25 percent from the first to the third intervalF8
an much more rapidly after that. To test whether the decline in sample
size significantly affects the results, we have also run regressions for
men 45-55 years old, and the results are generally quite similar to those
reported in Table 1, except that the coefficients of earnings and earnings
squared have less statistical significance. The significance is lower
partly because actual earnings at ages 1+5-54 are a poorer measure of
lifetime earnings than are actual earnings at ages 35-1+4.
38. These differences also imply that the average date of marriage was
earlier at later durations: the implied average date of marriage was
1946 [ =1967-(1+4.7-23.9)1, 1945, 1944, 1941, and 1938 in the
first through fifth intervals respectively.
39. The age at marriage with the minimum probability of divorce implied by
the regression coefficients ranged from 27.1 to 31.7 in the first
four intervals. The fifth interval has no implied minimum.
40.See, e.g., U.S. Census (l972a) ,orCarter and Gi ick (1970) ,especially
pp. 234-35. Ross and Sawhill (1975, p. 56) and Bumpass and Sweet (1972)
also find statistically and qualitatively significant effects of age
at marriage. Ross and Sawhill's linear coefficient implies that a
delay in age at marriage, cet. par., reduces the probability of
divorce over a four-year period by two percentage points (the average
probability in the sample is 7.6°.).
41. The upturn at older ages is in evidence for all marriage cohorts since
1920. See U.S. Census (1973) Table 4. The upturn is also evident for
1960 data in Carter and Glick (1970, p. 234).
42.In an often. cited study of 1960 Census data, Cutright (1971, p. 293)
also finds no appreciable effect of male's education on the stability of
first marriages when male's earnings are held constant.F9
43. The OLS regression estimates imply a positive effect of earnings on the
probability of divorce above earnings of about $33,300, $52,500, $25,000,
$48,400, and $46,300 in each of the five duration intervals respectively.
414.It should also encourage earlier marriages, and this implication is
strongly confirmed with the SEO survey (see Keeley, 1974).
145. The log of earning of each man in the SEO survey was regressed on his
years of schooling, experience (defined as age minus years of schooling
minus 6)., experience squared, and other variables (See the next two
paragraphs). Earnings expected at age 45 when marrying for the first
time are assumed to equal the earnings predicted from this regression
for age 145, with no adjustment for the secular growth in earnings
across cohorts (see the discussion in Section 11.6). "Unexpected
earnings" simply equals the absolute value of the difference between
actual and predicted earnings at the current age.
Married men tend to have higher earnings than separated or divorced
men (l6 higher in the 1967 SEO).If causality runs from earnings to
marital status, as emphasized in this paper, expected earnings should
be computed at actual marital status, and this is, in fact, how the
expected and unexpected earnings variables in Table 2 are computed. How-
ever, expected earnings should be computed net of the effect of marital
status if the causation runs from marital status to earnings (although
unexpected earnings should still be computed at actual marital status.)
Since there is evidence that the causation runs both ways (see Keley
19714) we have estimated E and IE- Elboth ways. The results with the
measure of expected earnings net of the effect of marital status are




Similarly, regressions have been run with measures of expected
earnings both gross and net of the effect of weeks worked. Again, the
results presented in Table 2 for E2 and IE -E2
are for the earnings
measure which includes the effect of weeks worked on earnings; again
the results using the measure of expected earnings net of weeks worked
were qualitatively similar, but somewhat weaker.
The third measure of expected earnings, E3, incorporates neither
the effect of marital status nor the effect of weeks worked on earnings.
However, the effects of these variables are present in unexpected
earn i ng s.
We do not have to emphasize that our estimates of expected and
unexpected earnings are extremely crude. They are used partly because
direct evidence on earnings expectations are unavailable, and partly
because the earnings generating function cannot be greatly expanded
since the SEO survey does not contain information on ability, actual
job experience, or other relevant variables.
L+6.For example, the regressions summarized by Table 2 were rerun replacing
the variable IE —Eby the two variables X1 =(EE1) if (E E1) >0






wise. The coefficients on these two variables were as follows: X1 =0.099
(t =1.22),0.032 (0.46), 0.16 (2.35), 0.053 (0.67), and 0.039 (0.41) in
the five time duration intervals respectively, and X2 =0.58(t 3.29)
0.23 (1.49), 0.25 (1.56), 0.73 (0.42), and 0.27 (1.06) respectively. So
in each interval both positive and negative deviations tend to raise the
probability of dissolution.Eli
47.In one recent nationwide data set, 88percent of currenft married
women with no child deaths were married only once, compared to less
than 80 percent of those with one or more deaths.Similarly, 88 percent
of ever-married women with no fetal loss were marriedonly once,
compared to 82 percent with one or more losses. Standardizing for
the age of women does not affect this basic picture. These calcula-
tions, based on the 1970 National Fertility Survey, were kindly supplied
by Anne D. Williams.
48. Michael Grossman kindly supplied the following tablebased on the
NBER-TH data:
MarriedDivorced
I. Current health =pasthealth
98.1 1.9
n 2518 48
2. Current health <pasthealth
97.4 2.6
n 1322 35
3. Current health >pasthealth
97.8 2.2
n 181 4
A Chi—squared test of the proportions in rows 1 and 2 yields
a test statistic that is significant only at a .85 level of confidence;
the test statistic for rows 1 and 3 is not at all significant. Infor-
mation on health status comes from two questions asked in a 1971survey:
"What is the state of your general health at present (excellent,good,
fair, poor)?" and "During the years you were attending high school
what was the state of your general health (excellent, good, fair,
poor, don't recall)?" Grossman (1976) analyzed these and other health
data.Fl2
1+9. The very low explanatory power of these independent variables is partly
explained by the low dissolution rates --notmore than 3.5 percent in each
duration interval. The independent variables in the Terman Sample
discussed later are not radically different from those used here,
but the divorce rates are much higher, 14 to 16 percent, the sample
sizes much smaller, and the coefficients of determination are much
larger (at least .10).
50. Selective attrition or sample censoring as a cohort moves through
time may bias the estimated effects from interval to interval.
51. The pooled regression is shown in the Appendix. The dependent
variable is defined as zero if the man remained married in the par-
ticular five—year interval being considered, and as one if he divorced
in that or any preceding five-year interval. The duration dummy
variables are defined as zero for all subsequent intervals and as
one for the particular and all preceding intervals.(E.g., the
values of the four dumies for an observation on the 15-20 year of
marriage are: =1;D2 =1; =1; =0.)
The statistical significance of the coefficients in column (7)
of Table I appears to be very high, but should not be taken seriously
because the number of degrees of freedom is greatly overstated. The
stastistical model can be written as
yi —+ ci
wherey. equals 1 if a dissolution occurred at duration i or in any
interval prior to i, X is a vector of independent variables that do
not depend on the duration interval , is a vector of coefficients
that may depend on duration, and c. is the error term. Since y. measures
the cumulative incidence of dissolutions, an increase in .notonly
increases but also y1÷2, etc. Therefore, the presumptionisF13
that c is serially correlated. Hence the standard errors used to
compute the t values in column (7) may greatly understate the true
standard errors because no allowance was made for the serial correla-
tion in the error term. We have not attempted to make such an allowance.
52. Estimated at the mean values of the other explanatory variables, the
duration dummy variables imply that the probability of divorce in the first
four five year intervals declines from 3.89 to 2.12 to 2.03 to l.84
respectively.
53. Assume that the error term defined in footnote 51 has two components,
=e





V. -dY.1 = (. — d.1)X÷u.
Since d is probably rather close to 1, this generalized first difference
equation can be simplified to
I
="I
-il AiX + u1 = +u.
This simple difference equation can be viewed as a series of estimating
equations, one for each duration interval, in which the dependent
variable measures the incidence of divorce in that interval. This
equation provides the statistical rationale for the OLS regressions
summarized in columns 1-5 of Table 1. (Whereas y is a derivative of
the unconditional probability in interval i, the estimated equations
are conditioned on there having been no divorce in any prior period.)
We are indebted to James Heckman for a helpful discussion on this
formulation.FlL





where p. is the probability of divorce during thethfive-yearinterval;




55.For the first marriage-interval, C1 was defined as .of the 15th month
into the interval instead of at the beginning of the interval. Further-
more the analysis was restricted to women whose first child was not more
than one year old at the date of first marriage. Hence C2 was omitted
from the first interval, and C3 was omitted from the first four intervals.
56. The full OLS regression results are shown in the Appendix.
57. The turning points for women range from ages 23.7 to 32.5 acrossthe
five Tntervals. For men, see footnote 39.
58. The probability would also be increased if the children conceived prior
to marriage were fathered by someone other than the currenthusband.
This explanation is pursued in Section 11.5 in the analysis of divorces
from second and later marriages.
Our results on the effect of premarital pregnancy are consistent
with many other studies. For example Grabill (1976, Table 9) shows with
1970 census data that the instability of marriage by 1970 is considerably
higher among women with a premaritafly conceived first child: e.g., among
women first married in 1965—69 the percent stablymarried with husband
present in 1970 was 85.5 percent for women without apremaritally con-
ceived first child, 81.6 percent for women whose first birth was within
six-months of marriage and 70.9 percent for women whose first birth
occurred before first marriage.F15
59. There is evidence that parents spend more time withyounger children
than with older children [see Gronau (1976),Leibowitz (1971+), Walker
(1976), and for an international comparison, Stone
(1972)], suggesting
that the care of younger children is moremarital-specific. Since
divorce tends to reduce the time spent by bothparents with their child-
ren, which presumably reduces the value of children toparents, the effect
of divorce on the value of children islikely to be greater for the
younger children (who absorb more time).
60. See Levinger (1965, p. 24), but alsosee Monahan (1955, pp 446-56).
61. See Carter and Glick (1970,p. 36), Platens (1973b); andJacobson (1959).
62. Ross and Sawhill (1975) use less detailedand linear measures of the
effects of children; perhaps this explainswhy they apparently "do not
find that. ..the presence of children hasany significant effect on
[marital] stability." (p. 57).
63. See Levinger's survey (1965,p. 24) for references to studies of the
impace of differences in age and education.
64. The subjects were non-randomly selected fromCalifornia elementary schools
in 1921, and had an IQ exceeding 135; thusthey are in the top l of the
IQdistribution. (Formore intensive discussions of thesample, see
Terman (1929—59), Leibowitz (1974), or Michael (1976).)
65.If persons who marry someone of anotherreligion are simply less comit-
ted to their religion, why should their dissolutionrates be higher
than those of persons who marry someone in theirreligion?
66. Rosenthal (1970, Table 2). Forexample, among Indiana couples previously
single, 32 percent intermarried if they lived in Communities withmany
Jews compared to 60 percent in communities with few Jews.F16
67. For example, in several small samples, Catholic girlswho marry before
age 19 intermarried about twice as frequentlyas Catholic girls marrying
between 19 and 22; Protestant and Jewish girls and boysof all three
religions also had much higher rates of intermarriagewhen they married
early (see Burchinal and Chancellor (1962) and Rosenthal(1963).
68. There is some evidence that premarital pregnancies arealso more common
when spouses differ in religion (see Christensen and Barber(1967))
which suggests that persons marry out of their religion partlybecause
of a premarital pregnancy.
69. Further support is provided by the relatively high ratesof intermarriage
of persons marrying (for the first time) over age 30 for we have argued
that they also have relatively high dissolution rates because theygain
less from marriage (see Burchinal and Chancellor (1963).
70. See Rosenthal (1970) for evidence on Jewish marriagesin Iowa during
1953—63 and in Indiana during 196063.
71. The standard error is relevant evidence on discordancebecause an
increase in search costs also increases the variability betweenthe
traits of mates (see Section 1.3). Wessels (1976) providesadditional
evidence that variability is greater at the tails of adistribution of
traits. Using a two-stage method that gives consistent estimates,the
variance of actual to "predicted" levels of spouse's education(or age
at marriage) is greatest at both tails of the education(or age at
marriage) distribution for the U.S. population. He also showsthat
the average education of the spouse is less than thatof the subject
at the upper tail (consistent with the evidence on concept masteryfrom
the Terman sample), and is greater than that of the subjectat the lower
tail of the distribution.Fl7
72. Comparison of this rate with comparable groups from the population at
large is hampered by the fact that most Census information pertains to
current marital status not marital history and we expect a relatively
high rate of remarriage among Terman women (see implication 8 in
Section 1.6).
73. Even in the optimal sorting, the expected gain from marriage would be
lower, and hence the probability of dissolution greater, when the
wage rate of the wife relative to that of her husband was greater (see
Section 1.2).
7+.Further evidence that an increase in the wife's wage rate has a desta-
bilizing effect on marriage is found in a study of the early experience
of the income maintenance experiments in Denver and Seattle (see Hannan,
Tuma and Groeneveld, 1976, pp. 60—61).
75. Other evidence comes from the analysis of aggregate data. Freiden (197k)
finds that the fraction of womenmarriedin different states, counties
of SMSA's is generally lower, even with age and several other variables
held constant, when their wage rates are higher relative to those of
men; Santos' findings (Santos, 1975) are similar.
76.In their report on the first 18 months of the Denver and Seattle income
maintenance experiments, Hannan, Tuma and Groeneveld (1976) conclude
"The overall impact of income maintenance is to increase the rate of
marital dissolution" (p. 116). By contrast, Sawhill, et al (1975) con-
clude from their study with the Michigan Panel data that "There is no
evidence.. .that higher welfare benefits increase separation rates among
low-income families" (p. 97), but ADFC recipiency (not level of payments)
"inhibits the marriage and remarriage rates of women who head families"
(p. 98).F18
77. Let the true demand function for children be
C=Z+aOXh+alX+a2{Xh -(d0+d1X)}2)
whereXh and X, are the education (or age) levels of the husband and
wife respectively, and Z is other variables. The term d0 +
d1Xgives
the value of Xh that is combined with X in the optimal sorting; hence
d1 >0if the optimal sorting has positive assortative mating. The
term Xh -(d0
+d1X)}2is a measure of the discrepancy between the
optimal and the actual value of Xh.Its coefficient a2 would be less
than zero because the probability of dissolutionwill be higher and
the demand for children smaller when the discrepancy is greater.













Since a <0and d >0,the coefficient of X X is o -2a d >0,and 2 1 hw 21
the coefficients of X2 and are a <0and a d2 <0.If d 0, the h w 2 21
coefficients of the linear term are unaffected by any discrepancy.
22 . . .. 2 2 Since X ,X,andX X are highly colinear, we eliminated X and X
hw hw h w
from the regression; this biases the coefficient of XhXW downward ——
i.e.,against our hypothesis ——becausethe omitted variables are both
positively correlated with XhX.
78.As indicated in the previous footnote, this coefficient is probably
biased downward.
79. Kiser (1968) used tabulations from the 1960 Census, and found evidence,
especially at the extreme levels of education, that couples with similar
educational levels had more children. He estimated that assortative
mating "increased the fertility by about 7 for white wives age 35—k4
and ll for white wives age 145-54"(p.112). Garrison, AndersonF19
and Reed (1968) state that couples with more similar education have
more children primarily because they are less likely to be childless.
Also see Willis (l971) and Ben-Porath (1974).
80. Participation in the labor force by married women isa (negative) proxy
for marital-specific capital because women who participate aregenerally
less speciaflzed in nonmarket activities. Participation by wivesshould
be greater, therefore, when the discrepancy between their traits and
those of their husbands is greater. A regression was rurc for the same
sample of SEO women and the same independent variables as in the
regression in Table 7 but with the dependent variable equal to one if
she participated in the labor force in 1966 and to zero otherwise. The
negative and statistically significant coefficients for both the age
and education interaction terms do sUggest that wives invest more in
market-oriented human capital when the discrepancy in traits is greater
(the race variable has essentially no effect (a t-value of 0.17)).
81. Since considerable time usually elapses between separation and divorce,
the time between dissolution and remarriage is much longer.
82. OLS regressions are shown in the Appendix. Note that whereas the
divorce probabilities analyzed in Section 11.1 are conditional ormarginal
probabilities for each successive five-year interval, the probabilities
of remarriage in Table 8 are cumulated over the total nyears from the
end of the first marriage. Hence the coefficients in Table 8 give the
effect of each variable during the entire time span specified.
83.Itwould be better to measure the earnings potential of men overage
50 by their wage rate rather than annual earnings because annual weeks
worked have a considerable htransitoryu variation at theseages, and
because remarriage itself might induce an increase in weeks worked and
thus in annual earnings. We have rerun these regressions replacingF20
annual earnings by weekly earnings, and these regressionsalso
exhibit a significant positive effect of earnings on the remarriagerate.
Similar evidence is found in other studies. For example,Sawhill,
Peabody, Jones and Caldwell (1976) find that an increasein family
income in a specified year (1967) raises the probabilitythat divorced
or widowed women remarry during the next five years(see p. 85). Hannan,
Tuma and Groeneveld (1976) report generally positive butinsignificant
effects of norma1" earnings on remarriage rates for whitesand for
Chicanos during the first 18 months of the Denver/Seattleincome main-
tenance experiment, but generally negative, insignificanteffects for
Blacks (see p. 87).
8k.It is not surprising, therefore, that expected earningsof divorced men,
a direct measure of the expected gainfrom marriage, and the duration
of marriage are positively related (e.g., a regressioncoefficient,
significant at a =.05,implies a 0.6 month increase in duration per
$1000 of expected earnings, holding othervariables constant).
85. Hannan etal. (1976) also find an insignificant negativeeffect for
women; Sawhill etal. (1976) report that theydropped an education variable
from their analysis because of insignificance.
86.For example, in the 1960 Census the number of unmarried mendeclined
continuously with age, while the number of unmarried womendeclined to
age 30-3k and rose thereafter. Thenumber of unmarried women per un-
married man, five years older, fell until the men were age30-3k and rose
















87. The selection of widows may not be completely independent of the
success of their marriage because "unhappy" persons probably die
more readily than "happy" ones. Since, however, the death rate of
widows is significantly lower than that of divorcees, widows do
appear to be "happier" than divorcees (see Fuchs, 197kb, p. 51Y
88. Evidence from the labor market indicates that many, if not most, persons
find a new job before they quit or are laid-off from their old one:
almost all quits and about 75 percent of layoffs were re-employed with
negligible unemployment in data from the Coleman-Rossi survey (Bartel
1975, p. 39).
89. According to a recent government publication (Platens, 1973b, pp. 15-16)
"before 1967, statistics on separation were collected only once, in 1907,
and published for the entire 20-year period of 1887—1906 for the United
States and every State". The median length of separation in that period
in the United States was 2.8 years and the median in different states
ranged from 1.8 to 5.7 years. For 16 states in the divorce registration
area in 1969 the median duration of time from separation to divorce
F2 I
Index of number of unmarried men
and women (age 30-34 =100).F22
ranged from 0.5 years in Kansas to 2.3 years in New York, and on
average over 8 percent of the divorces occurred more than five years
after separation (Platens, 1973a, Tables 21 and 22).
90. The fraction remarrying is much higher for divorced than for widowed
women and slightly higher for divorced than for widowed men when age
at termination of the first marriage is not held constant. For example,
five years after termination of the marriage, L8 of divorced men and 45
of widowed men in the SEO survey had remarried compared to of
divorced women and only 2l of widowed women. The explanation is
that widowed persons are generally older and many more women are
widowed than men. Since divorces occur much earlier and equal number
of men and women become divorced, the remarriage market is much better
for the younger still—fecund divorced woman than for the older widowed
woman.
This interpretation is borne out by figures from the U.S. Census Bureau
for June, 1971:
White men White women
First marriage
ended by: Number remarried Number remarried
(000) (000)
Age 52-56 in 1971
Divorcing 658 83.7 725 79.2
lidowing 176 68.8 719 35.3
Age 147-51 in 1971
Divorcing 786 84.1 889 76.8
Widowing 145 67.6 1494 146.2
Age 27—31 in 1971
Divorcing 53)4 74.7 821 70.14
Widowing 15 73.3 69 50.7
Source: Census (1972b), Table IF2 3
Our results suggest that these differences between widows and divorced
persons would be elimnated and probably reversed if age at termination
of the first marriage, and duration of exposure were held constant.
91. The coefficients are generally less statistically significant for women
partly because many fewer Terman women had remarried by 1950 (42 compared
to 72 Terman men).
92. The regression results for men are also consistent with those from the
SEC survey in two other regards: the probability of remarriage is
greater for men married longer the first time, and is not affected
by the age at which the men divorced. These Terman results for women,
however, are not consistent with those from the SEO survey, although
as noted in the previous footnote, the sample size is quite small
for women.
93. The SEO survey does not provide information on the children of divorced
(or widied) men.
9. Part of the explanation may be that men earn more than women since Table
8 clearly shows that higher earnings encourage remarriage. However,
the greater nonmarket productivity of women and their greater investment
in marital-specific capital presumably work in the other direction.
Moreover, the earnings of divorced women would probably be higher if
fathers had custody of children.
95. These predictions are estimated from regressions similar to those
reported in Table 4 but estimated for divorced women alone.
96. Differences between the remarriage rates of widowed men and women
are even larger than are those of divorced persons partly because
widows are older (see footnote 90) and perhaps partly because widowed
men try to remarry quickly in order to provide their children with a
parent who has or will acquire child-rearing--specific skills.F2LI
97.n 1953-55, there were 17 divorces per 100 first marriages, 35 per
100 marriages with both spouses previously divorced once, and a whop-
ping 79 per 100 marriages with both previously divorced at least
twice (Monahan, 1958, Table 5)
98. Note, however, that widows also remarry at older ages, and yet
apparently do not have higher probabilities of divorce.
99. For persons in their third marriage, the SEO survey did not askhow
or when their second marriage terminated. We were able to include
men in their third marriage by assuming that all were divorced(rather
than widowed) from their second marriage, and that their second marriage
terminated during its first five years if ten years elapsed from termi-
nation of the first marriage to commencement of the third, during the
the second five years if 15 years had elapsed, and so on. Women in
their third marriage were excluded because a significant fraction of
them were presumably widowed from their second marriage.
100. The other independent variables include age at current marriage, age,
education, earnings (in the men's regressions only) ,andnumber of
children from the current marriage (in the women's regressions only).
Earnings probably should be omitted since it partly measures the
expected gain from marriage, and therefore, picks up some of the explana-
tory power that should be attributed to the dummy variable measuring
marriage order.
101. As constructed, the first dummy variable's coefficientshows the effect
on the probability of dissolution of being previously divorced compared
to being in the first marriage, and the sum of the two dummyvariables'
coefficients shows the effect on the probability of dissolution of being
previously widowed compared to being in the first marriage.F2 5
102.The standardizations for age at current marriage, age and especially
duration of current marriage were decisive in these findings for men
and women.If the dummy variable distinguishing second and third from
first marriages, and widows from divorced persons were the only indepen-
dent variables, both men and women in later marriages wouldappear to
have a smaller propensity to divorce than persons in first marriages.
The explanation is mainly that persons in first marriages were generally
married longer, and thus had more opportunity to divorce sometime during
their marriage.
103.In 1953, the median duration to divorce was 6.5 years on first marriages,
3.5yearsif both spouses were previously divorced once, and only 1.7
years if both were previously divorced twice (Monahan, 1959, Table III).
104.We are not dealing with completed duration of marriage for all those who
ever divorce, but rather with completed duration for those who had divorced
as of 1966. Hence, as of 1966, second marriages will not have been exposed
as long to the risk of divorce, on average, as first marriages. Standardizing
for age and age at marriage, therefore, holds constant length of time at risk.
The regressions alluded to are not shown.
105. The positive effect of children from prior marriages could even be
underestimated because some of the effect may be picked up by the
premarital conception variable, which has a significant, positive coef-
ficient in he first two marriage duration intervals. A premarital
conception is defined here as any birth subsequent to the legal
termination of the first marriage and prior to the seventh month of
the second marriage, so it might capture the effect of children from
"prior marriages" if some of these births were conceived during the firstF26
marriage or conceived by someone other than the second husband during
the time interval between marriages. The positive effect of the pre-
marital conception variable in the first marriage regressions (see
(Table 4) may also be partly measuring the destabilizing effect of
children from "prior" unions.
106. For example, after 10 years of marriage by women currently married who
married between ages 23—26, 18 and 33 percent were childless, and the
average number of children born to women with children was 1.87 and
1.53,infirst and higher order marriages, respectively. Note, how-
ever, that children from prior marriages are excluded from these
comparisons, and they may partly satisfy the demand for children even
though they contribute to dissolution.
107.It was suggested at the outset of this paper that in the first fifteen
years of marriage the probability of divorcing is perhaps ten-times as
high as the probability of widowing. Using actual experience in the
interval 1960—1966 reported in Census (1971), the probabilities of
divorcing and widowing for men are 14.3 and 2.0 percent respectively
and for women 15.7 and 3.4 percent respectively, e.g., about 7fold
for men and 5-fold for women. As the national divorce rate has more
than doubled since 1960 (from 9.2 to 19.3 in 1974) the probability
of divorcing in the first 15 years of marriage based on today's rates
is probably twice as high.
108. Michael has begun a systematic analysis of the trend during the last
two decades.
109. Although we have no direct evidence, there is indirect evidence from
other laws; for example, minimum schooling laws have been mainly a
response to increased enrollments in school (see Landes, Solmon (1972)).F27
110. According to Table 8, the probability of remarriage is higher for
younger persons primarily during the first two years after a divorce.
Ill. The impact of a 10-year difference in age in Tables 1 and 1 is most
strongly positive in the first two duration intervals. However, the
comparison across intervals is somewhat misleading as a 10-year span
in the first interval represents only 1.7 standard deviations in the
independent variable while by the fifth interval, a 10-year span repre-
sents 3.3 standard deviations in the much—reduced dispersion in the
independent variable, age.
Furthermore, the period of calendar time represented by these five
marriage—duration intervals differs markedly, and divorce rates were
considerably higher in the mid—l940's than at any other time period
covered. The five marriage-duration intervals represented in the
first five columns of Table I commenced on the average in the years
1946, 1951, 1954, 1956, 1958 respectively, so in higher—order intervals
older men are more likely to have been observed during the time interval
(1945-1947) in which divorce rates were especially high. That factor
would tend to impose a negative coefficient on the age variable. The
same qualification applies to Table 14.
112. The appropriate way to standardize for differences in earnings also
partly depends on the life cycle in earnings.If, for example, a 35
and a 145 year old person had the same earnings in 1966, the younger person
would generally have the higher earnings profile because earnings tend to
increase between ages 35 and 45.Table A-i.Propensity to
Aged 35—55in
Dissolve First Marriage by Duration Married. White Men,
































































Constant 39.43 14.09 11.92 10.18 -1.00
r2 .011 .003 .007 .006 .008
F 8.18 1.90 3.96 2.11 1.45
N 4413 4045 3337 2156 1089
Coefficientsare percentage point effects.
4Table A-2. Propensity to Dissolve First Marriage by Duration Married. White Women,
Aged 35—55 in 1967. OLS Estimates.(t—values in parentheses).
Duration Married
0—5 years 5—10 years 10-15 years 15-20 years 20-25 years
AM -2.18 -1.L7 -2.11 -2.06 -1.84
(5.80) (3.28) (3.79) (3.27) (1.85)
AM2 .38E-01 .23E-0l .140E-0l .140E-0l .39E-0l
(4.91) (2.37) (3.23) (2.72) (1.59)
S -.11 .25E-Ol .76E-0l -.L+4E-0l .52E-0l
(1.11) (.25) (.73) (.43) (.1+3)
A -.41+E-Q1 -.62E—0l -.13E-01 .4E-02 .11
(.9L) (1.28) (.25) (.07) (1.08)
P 1.21+ 3.1+4 1.03 .92 -1.98
(1.02) (2.91 (.84) (.78) (1.36)
C
—1.lli —2.57 -3.08 -2.02 1.04
(1.98) (3.80) (4.92) (3.29) (.83)





.46 .1+3 .18 .33E-01
1 2 3 (2.33) (4.03) (2.1+5 (.1+7)
Constant 36.01 28.80 31.60 29.146 16.03
r2 .0114 .013 .012 .013 .009
F 12.63 10.09 6.85 5.23 1.83
N 5509 5184 1+588 3235 1871
Coefficients are percentage point effects.Table A—3. Cumulative Propensity to Dissolve First Marriage by Duration
Married, with Dummy Variables for Duration. White Men,













D1 (= 1if dependent variable refers 2 12
to duration of 5 or more years
since date of first marriage)
D2 (= 1if dependent variable refers 2 03
to duration of 10 or more years (355)
since date of first marriage)
D. (= 1if dependent variable refers 1 8k 'toduration of 15 or more years (274)
since date of first marriage)
Dk (= 1if dependent variable refers 1 k6
to duration of 20 or more years
(





Coefficients are percentage point effectsTable A-4. Cumulative Propensity to Remarry by Duration Since First
Marriage Ended. OLS Estimates. Ct-values in parentheses).
- -
A.White Men, Aged 50-65 in 1967
Duration Since First Marriage Ended:
2 years 5 years 10 years 15 years
AD 2.38 1.75 -.66 3.38
(1.43) (.78) (.22) (.97)
AD2 —.36E—01 -.33E—01 -.92E-02 -.80E-0l
(1.71) (1.11) (.22) (1.53).
S .81 1.01+ -.1+6 -.79
(1.06) (1.12) (.1+7) (.78)
Dur 1.02 1.13 .88 .94
(2.49) (2.20) (1.56) (1.51+)
A -.28 -.83E—01 .16 1.18
(.49) (.12) (.23) (1.66)
E 1.23 1.58 2.12 2.10
(2.06) (2.30) (3.02) (2.78)
W -8.22 -3.26 -7.83 -9.85
(1.51) (.50) (1.17) (1.48)
Constant —16.90 2.04 74.L7 -24.11+
r2 .058 .052 .071 .113
F 3.02 2.39 2.78 3.80
N 35i 310 261 216
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